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Abstract
Systemic risk is concerned with the instability of a financial system whose members are
interdependent in the sense that the failure of a few institutions may trigger a chain of de-
faults throughout the system. Recently, several systemic risk measures are proposed in the
literature that are used to determine capital requirements for the members subject to joint risk
considerations. We address the problem of computing systemic risk measures for systems with
sophisticated clearing mechanisms. In particular, we consider the Eisenberg-Noe network model
and the Rogers-Veraart network model, where the former one is extended to the case where op-
erating cash flows in the system are unrestricted in sign. We propose novel mixed-integer linear
programming problems that can be used to compute clearing vectors for these models. Due to
the binary variables in these problems, the corresponding (set-valued) systemic risk measures
fail to have convex values in general. We associate nonconvex vector optimization problems to
these systemic risk measures and solve them by a recent nonconvex variant of Benson’s algorithm
which requires solving two types of scalar optimization problems. We provide a detailed analysis
of the theoretical features of these problems for the extended Eisenberg-Noe and Rogers-Veraart
models. We test the proposed formulations on computational examples and perform sensitivity
analyses with respect to some model-specific and structural parameters.
Keywords and phrases: systemic risk measure, aggregation function, set-valued risk measure,
systemic risk, capital requirement, Eisenberg-Noe model, Rogers-Veraart model, Benson’s algo-
rithm, nonconvex vector optimization.
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1 Introduction
Financial contagion is usually associated with a chain of failures in a financial system triggered by
external correlated shocks as well as direct or indirect interdependencies among the members of
the system leading to, from an economic point of view, undesirable consequences such as financial
crisis, necessity for bailout loans, economic regression, rise in national debt and so on. A good
example is a bank run, when a large number of holders withdraw their money from a bank due
to panic or decrease in confidence in the bank, causing insolvency of the bank. In turn, the bank
may call its claims from the other banks, decreasing confidence in them and causing new bank
runs. Being unable to meet their liabilities, some of the banks may become bankrupt and, thus,
aggravate the contagion even further. Unlike the usual notion of risk, when it is associated with a
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single entity, systemic risk is related to the strength of an entire financial system against financial
contagions.
In this paper, we consider financial systems in which members have direct links to each other
through contractual liabilities. When the members realize their operating cash flows, the actual
interbank payments are determined through a clearing procedure. As an example of such systems,
Eisenberg and Noe (2001) models a financial system as a static directed network of banks where
interbank liabilities are attached to the arcs. Assuming a positive operating cash flow for each
bank, the paper develops two approaches to calculate a clearing vector, that is, a vector of pay-
ments to meet interbank liabilities. The first is a simple algorithm, called the fictitious default
algorithm, which gradually calculates a clearing vector by finitely many updates. The second is a
laconic mathematical programming problem with linear constraints determined by the liabilities,
the operating cash flows, and an arbitrary strictly increasing objective function. In particular, one
can choose a linear objective function so that a clearing vector is calculated as an optimal solution
of a linear programming problem.
The former algorithmic approach is preferred by most of the scholars that work in network
models of systemic risk. Suzuki (2002) introduces a similar approach to evaluate clearing vec-
tors as in Eisenberg and Noe (2001). In addition, Suzuki (2002) considers cross-holdings of stock
among members of a financial system. Cifuentes et al. (2005) investigates systemic risk in terms
of liquidity of institutions in a financial system and considers unsteadiness of asset prices as well.
Unlike earlier works, the network model in this paper differentiates between liquid and illiquid as-
sets. Elsinger (2009) extends the work in Eisenberg and Noe (2001) by introducing a cross-holdings
structure similar to the one in Suzuki (2002). Additionally, Elsinger (2009) relaxes the positivity
assumption on operating cash flows of the members in a system and studies the model by imposing
some seniority assumptions. Rogers and Veraart (2013) introduces default costs to the model in
Eisenberg and Noe (2001). In addition, one of the main focuses in Rogers and Veraart (2013) is
devoted to the investigation of the necessity of bailing out procedures for the defaulting institutions.
It is shown that under strictly positive default costs, it might be beneficial for some of the solvent
institutions to take over insolvent institutions. Weber and Weske (2017) integrates many of the fac-
tors that contribute to systemic risk into one network model. These factors include cross-holdings
introduced in Suzuki (2002) and Elsinger (2009), file sales investigated in Cifuentes et al. (2005),
and bankruptcy costs viewed in Elsinger (2009) and Rogers and Veraart (2013). Weber and Weske
(2017) takes the model in Eisenberg and Noe (2001) as a base and introduces all the above factors
simultaneously, making it more realistic and compex at the same time. For a detailed review of
network models of systemic risk, the reader is referred to the survey Kabanov et al. (2017), which
focuses on the existence and uniqueness of clearing vectors in the models mentioned above as well
as their calculations by certain variations of the fictitious default algorithm in Eisenberg and Noe
(2001). However, none of the above works builds on the second mathematical programming ap-
proach of Eisenberg and Noe (2001).
On the other hand, the operating cash flows of the members of a network are typically subject
to uncertainty due to correlated risk factors. Hence, these cash flows can be modeled as one
possible realization of a random vector with possibly correlated components. Then, the resulting
clearing vector is a deterministic function of the operating cash flow random vector, where the
deterministic function is defined through the underlying clearing mechanism. Based on the random
clearing vector, one can define various systemic risk measures to calculate the necessary capital
allocations for the members of the network in order to control some (nonlinear) averages over
different scenarios. This is the main focus of a recent stream of research started with Chen et al.
(2013). Using the clearing mechanism, one defines a random aggregate quantity associated to the
clearing vector, such as the total debt paid in the system or the total equity made by all members
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as a result of clearing. This aggregate quantity can be seen as a deterministic and scalar function,
called the aggregation function, of the operating cash flow vector. In Chen et al. (2013), a systemic
risk measure is defined as a scalar functional of the operating cash flow vector that measures the
risk of the random aggregate quantity through a convex risk measure (Fo¨llmer and Schied, 2011,
Chapter 4) such as negative expected value, average value-at-risk or entropic risk measure.
The value of the systemic risk measure in Chen et al. (2013) can be seen as the total capital
requirement for the system to keep the risk of the aggregate quantity at an acceptable level. How-
ever, since the total capital is used only after the shock is aggregated, the allocation of this total
back into the members of the system remains as a question to be addressed by an additional proce-
dure. To that end, set-valued and scalar systemic risk measures that are considered “sensitive” to
capital levels are proposed in Feinstein et al. (2017) and Biagini et al. (2018), respectively. These
systemic risk measures look for deterministic capital allocation vectors that are directly used to
augment the random operating cash flow vector. Hence, the new augmented cash flow vector is
aggregated and the risk of the resulting random aggreagate quantity is controled by a convex risk
measure as in Chen et al. (2013). In particular, the value of the set-valued systemic risk measure
in Feinstein et al. (2017) is the set of all “feasible” capital allocation vectors, which addresses the
measurement and allocation of systemic risk as a joint problem.
The sensitive systemic risk measures studied in Feinstein et al. (2017) and Biagini et al. (2018)
have convenient theoretical properties when the underlying aggregation function is simple enough.
In Ararat and Rudloff (2016), assuming a monotone and concave aggregation function, it has been
shown that the set-valued sensitive systemic risk measure is a convex set-valued risk measure in the
sense of Hamel et al. (2011) and dual representations are obtained in terms of the conjugate function
of the aggregation function. In particular, the aggregation function for the Eiseberg-Noe model,
assuming positive operating cash flows as in the original formulation in Eisenberg and Noe (2001),
is monotone and concave, and an explicit dual representation is obtained for the corresponding
systemic risk measure of this model.
In this paper, we are concerned with the computation of a sensitive systemic risk measure
discussed above. We relate the value of this systemic risk measure to a vector (multiobjective)
optimization problem whose “efficient frontier” corresponds to the boundary of the systemic risk
measure. The vector optimization problem has a risk constraint written in terms of the aggregation
function. The main challenge in solving this problem is that the aggregation function needs to be
evaluated for every scenario of the underlying probability space as well as for every choice of the cap-
ital allocation vector, which is the decision variable of the optimization problem. For the standard
Eisenberg-Noe model, thanks to the linear programming characterization of the clearing vectors,
one can formulate the aggregation function in terms of a linear programming problem parametrized
by the scenario and the capital allocation vector. Hence, the ultimate vector optimization problem
can be seen as a nested optimization problem.
We focus particularly on models beyond the standard Eisenberg-Noe framework with positive
operating cash flows. In particular, we consider an extension of the Eisenberg-Noe model by relaxing
the positivity assumption as well as the Rogers-Veraart model with default costs. It turns out that
both models have a common type of singularity that can be formulated in terms of binary variables,
a novel feature studied in this paper. One of our main contributions is to develop mixed-integer
linear programming problems that calculate clearing vectors in these models. We fix the objective
functions of these optimization problems in such a way that the optimal values give the total debts
paid at clearing in the corresponding models. Hence, we calculate the aggregation functions as the
optimal values of these optimization problems.
The existence of binary variables in optimization problems results in lack of concavity for the
corresponding aggregation functions. Consequently, the sensitive systemic risk measures for the
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two models do not possess the nice theoretical features such as convexity and dual representations
studied in the earlier papers on systemic risk measures. Indeed, we even have that the values of
these systemic risk measures fail to be convex sets, in general. Therefore, one of our fundamental
observations is that binary variables and the accompanying lack of concavity/convexity show up
naturally at the cost of using more sophisticated aggregation mechanisms beyond the standard
Eisenberg-Noe framework.
Going back to the computations of systemic risk measures, the associated vector optimization
problems are consequently nonconvex, in general. We use the Benson-type algorithm for such
problems developed recently in Nobakhtian and Shafiei (2017). The algorithm (as well as its original
version in Benson (1998)) has two “blackbox” subroutines for the following two scalar optimization
problems: weighted-sum scalarization problem and the problem of calculating the minimum step-
length to hit the efficient frontier from an outside point. It should be noted that the algorithm in
Nobakhtian and Shafiei (2017) assumes that these scalar problems are solvable by some unspecified
methods and the convergence of the algorithm is guaranteed based on this assumption. In our
context, we formulate these problems as mixed-integer linear programming problems for a generic
aggregation function that is formulated in terms of a mixed-integer linear programming problem.
We address further questions regarding the the finiteness of the optimal values and existence of
feasible/optimal solutions separately for each of the extended Eisenberg-Noe model and the Rogers-
Veraart model.
We perform a detailed computational study for both models as well as sensitivity analyses
with respect to some model parameters such as the default cost parameters in the Rogers-Veraart
model, the threshold level used in the risk constraint, and also some parameters determining the
interconnectedness of the network.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We study the Eisenberg-Noe and Rogers-Veraart
network models in detail together with the mathematical programming characterizations of clearing
vectors in Section 2. In Section 3, we study the sensitive systemic risk measures and their associated
nonconvex vector optimization problems. The proofs of some results in Sections 2, 3 are deferred
to Appendices A, B, respectively. We present the computational results in Section 4.
2 Network models of systemic risk
In this section, after reviewing the original Eisenberg-Noe network model in Section 2.1, we propose
a seniority-based extension of this model by allowing signed operating cash flows in Section 2.2
and provide a novel mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) formulations of clearing vectors in
Theorem 2.7. Then, in Section 2.3, we consider the Rogers-Veraart network model and provide a
novel MILP formulation of clearing vectors in Theorem 2.17.
Let us introduce the related notation. Let n ∈ N = {1, 2, . . .}. Given a, b ∈ R, we write
a ∧ b = min {a, b}, a ∨ b = max {a, b}, a+ = 0 ∨ a, and a− = 0 ∨ (−a). Similarly, given a =
(a1, . . . , an)
T, b = (b1, . . . , bn)
T ∈ Rn, we write
a ∧ b = (a1 ∧ b1, . . . , an ∧ bn)T, a ∨ b = (a1 ∨ b1, . . . , an ∨ bn)T
as well as a+ = 0 ∨ a, and a− = 0 ∨ (−a), where 0 = (0, . . . , 0)T ∈ Rn. We sometimes use
1 = (1, . . . , 1)T ∈ Rn as well. The vector a⊙ b = (a1b1, . . . , anbn)T denotes the Hadamard product
of a, b. We write a ≤ b if and only if ai ≤ bi for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. In this case, we also define the
rectangle [a, b] = [a1, b1] × . . . × [an, bn] ⊆ Rn. Using ≤ on Rn, we define Rn+ = {x ∈ Rn | 0 ≤ x},
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whose elements are said to be positive. Finally,
‖a‖∞ = max
i∈{1,...,n}
|ai|
is the ℓ∞-norm of a.
2.1 Eisenberg-Noe network model
In this section, the original Eisenberg-Noe network model in Eisenberg and Noe (2001) and its
corresponding aggregation function are provided for completeness.
Definition 2.1. A quadruple (N ,pi, p¯,x) is called an Eisenberg-Noe network if N = {1, . . . , n}
for some n ∈ N, pi = (πij)i,j∈N ∈ Rn×n+ is a stochastic matrix with πii = 0 and
∑n
j=1 πji < n for
each i ∈ N , p¯ = (p¯1, . . . , p¯n)T ∈ Rn++, and x = (x1, . . . , xn)T ∈ Rn+.
In Definition 2.1, N is the index set of nodes in a network that represents a financial system of
n institutions. For every i ∈ N , p¯i > 0 denotes the total amount of liabilities of node i. We call p¯
the total obligation vector.
For every i, j ∈ N such that i 6= j, πij > 0 denotes the fraction of the total liability of node i
owed to node j. We call pi the relative liabilities matrix. For every i ∈ N , the assumption πii = 0
means that node i cannot have liabilities to itself. By
∑n
j=1 πji < n for every i ∈ N , we assume
that no node owns all the claims in the network. Note that, given p¯ and pi, for every i, j ∈ N , the
nominal liability lij of node i to node j can be calculated as lij = πij p¯i.
For each i ∈ N , xi ≥ 0 denotes the operating cash flow of node i. We call x the operating cash
flow vector.
Let (N ,pi, p¯,x) be an Eisenberg-Noe network. For each i ∈ N , let pi ≥ 0 be the sum of all
payments made by node i to the other nodes in the network. Then, p = (p1, . . . , pn)
T ∈ Rn+ is
called a payment vector.
Definition 2.2. A vector p ∈ [0, p¯] is called a clearing vector for (N ,pi, p¯,x) if it satisfies the
following properties:
• Limited liability: for each i ∈ N , pi ≤
∑n
j=1 πjipj + xi, which implies that node i cannot pay
more than it has.
• Absolute priority: for each i ∈ N , either pi = p¯i or pi =
∑n
j=1 πjipj + xi, which implies that
node i either meets its obligations in full or else it defaults by paying as much as it has.
Let ΦEN+ : [0, p¯]→ [0, p¯] be defined by
ΦEN+ (p) :=
(
piTp+ x
)
∧ p¯. (2.1)
It is shown in Eisenberg and Noe (2001) that a clearing vector p for (N ,pi, p¯,x) is a fixed point of
ΦEN+, that is, ΦEN+(p) = p.
Next, we recall the programming characterization of clearing vectors shown in Eisenberg and Noe
(2001), which is the basis of our generalizations to follow. We say that a function f : Rn → R is
strictly increasing if a ≤ b and a 6= b imply f (a) < f (b) for every a, b ∈ Rn.
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Proposition 2.3. (Eisenberg and Noe, 2001, Lemma 4) Let f : Rn → R be a strictly increasing
function. Consider the following optimization problem with linear constraints:
max f (p)
s.t. p ≤ piTp+ x,
p ∈ [0, p¯] .
(2.2)
If p ∈ Rn+ is an optimal solution to this optimization problem, then it is a clearing vector for
(N ,pi, p¯,x).
Each member in a network has its impact on economy. As in Chen et al. (2013), Biagini et al.
(2018), Feinstein et al. (2017), Ararat and Rudloff (2016), we use aggregation functions to summa-
rize these individual effects and provide a total impact of the network on economy. They play a
significant role in evaluating systemic risks and in the computation of systemic risk measures. The
aggregation function Λ : Rn → R for the Eisenberg-Noe network (N ,pi, p¯,x) is defined as
Λ (x) := sup
{
f (p) | p ≤ piTp+ x, p ∈ [0, p¯]
}
, (2.3)
where f : Rn → R is a strictly increasing function, namely, Λ(x) is the optimal value of the problem
in (2.2).
2.2 Signed Eisenberg-Noe network model
In the original Eisenberg-Noe network model, it is assumed that the operating cash flow vector is
positive. In reality, however, it may happen that an institution has liabilities to external entities not
modeled as part of the network resulting in a negative operating cash flow or a positive operating
cost.
Definition 2.4. A quadruple (N ,pi, p¯,x) is called a signed Eisenberg-Noe network if N , pi and p¯
are as in Definition 2.1, and x = (x1, . . . , xn)
T ∈ Rn.
Note that Definition 2.4 removes the positivity assumption on the operating cash flow vector
x. Our aim is to provide a new definition of clearing vector by extending Definition 2.2 with an
additional seniority assumption for negative operating cash flows. Based on this definition, we
prove a fixed-point and a mathematical programming characterization of clearing vectors. Finally,
we introduce an associated aggregation function through a MILP problem.
Let (N ,pi, p¯,x) be a signed Eisenberg-Noe network. We assume that the nodes that have
obligations outside the network, that is, the nodes with negative operating cash flows have to meet
these obligations first, and if they do not default in this “first round,” then they should meet
their obligations to the other nodes inside the network. At this “second round”, as in the original
Eisenberg-Noe network model, they either meet their obligations to the other nodes in full or pay
as much as they have at hand and default. This motivates the following definition.
Definition 2.5. A vector p ∈ [0, p¯] is called a clearing vector for (N ,pi, p¯,x) if it satisfies the
following properties:
• Immediate default: for each i ∈ N , if ∑nj=1 πjipj + xi ≤ 0, then pi = 0.
• Limited liability: for each i ∈ N , if ∑nj=1 πjipj + xi > 0, then pi ≤ ∑nj=1 πjipj + xi, which
implies that if node i has a strictly positive operating cash flow, then it cannot pay more than
it has.
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• Absolute priority: for each i ∈ N , if ∑nj=1 πjipj + xi > 0, then either pi = p¯i or pi =∑n
j=1 πjipj + xi, which implies that if node i has a strictly positive operating cash flow, then
it either meets its obligations in full or else it defaults by paying as much as it has.
Let ΦEN : [0, p¯]→ [0, p¯] be defined by
ΦEN (p) :=
(
p¯ ∧
(
piTp+ x
))+
, (2.4)
or more explicitly, for each i ∈ N ,
ΦENi (p) =


0 if
∑n
j=1 πjipj + xi ≤ 0,∑n
j=1 πjipj + xi if 0 <
∑n
j=1 πjipj + xi ≤ p¯i,
p¯i if
∑n
j=1 πjipj + xi > p¯i.
(2.5)
Observe that, if x ∈ Rn+, then ΦEN coincides with the function ΦEN+ in (2.1) defined for the original
Eisenberg-Noe network model.
We establish the fixed point characterization of clearing vectors next.
Proposition 2.6. A vector p ∈ [0, p¯] is a clearing vector for (N ,pi, p¯,x) if and only if it is a fixed
point of ΦEN.
Proof. To prove the “only if” part, let p = (p1, . . . , pn)
T ∈ [0, p¯] be a clearing vector. To show that
p is a fixed point of ΦEN, let i ∈ N .
If
∑n
j=1 πjipj + xi ≤ 0, then pi = 0, by immediate default, and ΦENi (p) = 0, by (2.4). Hence,
ΦENi (p) = pi.
If
∑n
j=1 πjipj + xi > 0, then, by absolute priority, either pi = p¯i or pi =
∑n
j=1 πjipj + xi.
If pi = p¯i, then, by limited liability, p¯i ≤
∑n
j=1 πjipj + xi and, thus, by (2.4), Φ
EN
i (p) = p¯i.
Hence, ΦENi (p) = pi. On the other hand, if pi =
∑n
j=1 πjipj + xi < p¯i, then, by (2.4), Φ
EN
i (p) =∑n
j=1 πjipj + xi. Hence, again Φ
EN
i (p) = pi. Thus, p is a fixed point of Φ
EN.
To prove the “if” part, let p = (p1, . . . , pn)
T be a fixed point of ΦEN. In other words, for every
i ∈ N , ΦENi (p) = pi. To show that p is a clearing vector, let i ∈ N .
If
∑n
j=1 πjipj + xi ≤ 0, then ΦENi (p) = pi = 0, by (2.4). Hence, immediate default holds.
If
∑n
j=1 πjipj + xi > 0, then Φ
EN
i (p) = pi ≤
∑n
j=1 πjipj + xi, by (2.4). Hence, limited liability
holds.
Now assume
∑n
j=1 πjipj+xi > 0. If
∑n
j=1 πjipj+xi ≤ p¯i, then ΦEN (p) = pi =
∑n
j=1 πjipj+xi.
If
∑n
j=1 πjipj + xi > p¯i, then Φ
EN (p) = pi = p¯i, by (2.4). Hence, absolute priority holds as well.
Hence, p is a clearing vector.
The next theorem is the main result of Section 2.2. It extends Proposition 2.3 for the signed
Eisenberg-Noe network model by showing that a clearing vector can be calculated as an optimal
solution of a certain MILP. Hence, relaxing the positivity assumption on the operating cash flow
vector is at the cost of using binary variables in the mathematical programming characterization of
clearing vectors, hence, adding a discrete feature to the originally continuous optimization problem.
Theorem 2.7. Let ΛEN : Rn → R be a MILP aggregation function defined by
ΛEN (y) := sup
{
f (p) | p ≤
[
piTp+ y +M (1− s)
]
∧ (p¯⊙ s) ,
piTp+ y ≤Ms,p ∈ [0, p¯] , s ∈ {0, 1}n
}
,
(2.6)
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where f : Rn → R is a strictly increasing linear function and M = n ‖p¯‖∞ + ‖y‖∞. If (p, s) is an
optimal solution to MILP for ΛEN (x), then p is a clearing vector for (N ,pi, p¯,x).
Remark 2.8. ΛEN fails to be concave in general.
Observe that ΛEN (x) can be written more explicitly as
maximize f (p) (2.7)
subject to pi ≤
n∑
j=1
πjipj + xi +M (1− si) , i ∈ N , (2.8)
pi ≤ p¯isi, i ∈ N , (2.9)
n∑
j=1
πjipj + xi ≤Msi, i ∈ N , (2.10)
0 ≤ pi ≤ p¯i, i ∈ N , (2.11)
si ∈ {0, 1} , i ∈ N . (2.12)
Let u = (u1, . . . , un)
T ∈ {0, 1}n be a binary vector, where ui = 0 if xi < 0, and ui = 1 if
xi ≥ 0, for each i ∈ N . Then (p, s) = (0,u) ∈ Rn × Zn is a feasible solution to the MILP in (2.7).
Moreover, since f is a bounded function on the rectangle [0, p¯] ⊆ Rn+, by Meyer (1974, Theorem
2.1), the MILP has an optimal solution. Observe that, by Theorem 2.7, the existence of an optimal
solution to the MILP in (2.7) proves the existence of a clearing vector for the network (N ,pi, p¯,x).
Remark 2.9. In Theorem 2.7, M = n ‖p¯‖∞ + ‖x‖∞ is taken to ensure the feasibility of the
constraint (2.10). In other words, it is enough to choose M such that
∑n
j=1 πjipj + xi ≤ M , for
each i ∈ N and for every p ∈ [0, p¯]. Furthermore, for each i ∈ N and for every p ∈ [0, p¯], since∑n
j=1 πji < n, it holds
∑n
j=1 πjipj < n ‖p¯‖∞. Hence,
∑n
j=1 πjipj + xi ≤ n ‖p¯‖∞ + ‖x‖∞ =M .
Remark 2.10. The linearity of f is not a necessary condition for Theorem 2.7 to hold.
The proof of Theorem 2.7 is based on the following lemma.
Lemma 2.11. Let (p, s) be an optimal solution to the MILP for ΛEN (x). Let i ∈ N such that
0 <
∑n
j=1 πjipj + xi. Then, pi = min
{∑n
j=1 πjipj + xi, p¯i
}
.
The proof of Lemma 2.11 can be found in Appendix A.1.
Proof of Theorem 2.7. Let (p, s) be an optimal solution to the MILP for ΛEN (x). To prove that
p is a clearing vector, by Proposition 2.6, we equivalently show that ΦEN (p) = p. Let i ∈ N .
Recalling (2.5), we consider three cases:
(1)
n∑
j=1
πjipj + xi ≤ 0, (2) 0 <
n∑
j=1
πjipj + xi ≤ p¯i, (3)
n∑
j=1
πjipj + xi > p¯i.
(1) Assume that
∑n
j=1 πjipj + xi ≤ 0. Then, by (2.4), ΦENi (p) = 0. By the arguments from the
proof of the Lemma 2.11 for this case, pi = 0. Hence, pi = 0 = Φ
EN
i (p).
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(2) Assume that 0 <
∑n
j=1 πjipj + xi ≤ p¯i. Then, by (2.4), ΦENi (p) =
∑n
j=1 πjipj + xi. Since
0 <
∑n
j=1 πjipj + xi, by Lemma 2.11,
pi = min


n∑
j=1
πjipj + xi, p¯i

 =
n∑
j=1
πjipj + xi.
Hence, pi =
∑n
j=1 πjipj + xi = Φ
EN
i (p).
(3) Assume
∑n
j=1 πjipj + xi > p¯i. Then, by (2.4), Φ
EN
i (p) = p¯i. Since
∑n
j=1 πjipj + xi > p¯i > 0,
again by Lemma 2.11,
pi = min


n∑
j=1
πjipj + xi, p¯i

 = p¯i.
Hence, pi = p¯i = Φ
EN
i (p).
Therefore, p is a clearing vector for (N ,pi, p¯,x).
Remark 2.12. Instead of the seniority-based approach developed above, a naive approach would
be to introduce an additional node and consider negative operational cash flows of the nodes as
liabilities to this additional node, which itself has neither obligations nor an operating cash flow, as
suggested in Eisenberg and Noe (2001). This approach is valid for the fictitious default algorithm
described in Eisenberg and Noe (2001) and this way a clearing vector for the original network
can be found. However, the modified network lacks a solid interpretation in terms of the original
network since the relative liabilities matrix of the new network depends on the operational cash
flow vector. Hence, we do not follow this route here.
2.3 Rogers-Veraart network model
In Rogers and Veraart (2013), the original Eisenberg-Noe network model is extended by including
default costs. It is assumed that a defaulting node is not able to use all of its liquid assets to meet
its obligations. Unlike the Eisenberg-Noe model, the possibility of a mathematical programming
formulation for clearing vectors seems to be an open problem for the Rogers-Veraart. We fill up this
gap by proposing a MILP whose optimal solution includes a clearing vector for the Rogers-Veraart
network model. Based on this characterization, we define an aggregation function and provide
its relationship to the network model. Finally, inspired by Definition 2.2, we propose a weaker
definition of a clearing vector for the Rogers-Veraart network model.
Definition 2.13. A sextuple (N ,pi, p¯,x, α, β) is called a Rogers-Veraart network if N = {1, . . . , n}
for some n ∈ N, pi = (πij)i,j∈N ∈ Rn×n+ is a stochastic matrix with πii = 0 and
∑n
j=1 πji < n for
each i ∈ N , p¯ = (p¯1, . . . , p¯n)T ∈ Rn++, x = (x1, . . . , xn)T ∈ Rn+ and α, β ∈ (0, 1].
As in Definition 2.1, N is the set of nodes in a network with n institutions, p¯ is the total
obligation vector, pi is the matrix of relative liabilities and x is the operating cash flow vector. It is
assumed that a defaulting node may not be able to use all of its liquid assets to meet its obligations.
For this purpose, we use α as the fraction of the operating cash flow and β as the fraction of the
cash inflow from other nodes that can be used by a defaulting node to meet its obligations.
Let (N ,pi, p¯,x, α, β) be a Rogers-Veraart network. For each i ∈ N , let pi ≥ 0 be the sum of
all payments made by node i to the other nodes in the network. Then, p = (p1, . . . , pn)
T ∈ Rn+ is
called a payment vector.
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Motivated by Definition 2.2 of a clearing vector for an Eisenberg-Noe network, we suggest the
following similar definition of a clearing vector for the Rogers-Veraart network (N ,pi, p¯,x, α, β).
Definition 2.14. A vector p ∈ [0, p¯] is called a clearing vector for (N ,pi, p¯,x, α, β) if it satisfies
the following properties:
• Limited liability: for each i ∈ N , pi ≤ xi +
∑n
j=1 πjipj, which implies that node i cannot pay
more than it has.
• Absolute priority: for each i ∈ N , either pi = p¯i or pi = αxi + β
∑n
j=1 πjipj, which implies
that node i either has to meet its obligations in full or else it defaults by paying as much as
it can.
Let ΦRV+ : [0, p¯]→ [0, p¯] be defined by
Φ
RV+
i (p) :=
{
p¯i if p¯i ≤ xi +
∑n
j=1 πjipj,
αxi + β
∑n
j=1 πjipj if p¯i > xi +
∑n
j=1 πjipj,
(2.13)
for each i ∈ N .
Observe that, if α = 1 and β = 1, then the function ΦRV+ becomes the usual ΦEN+ in (2.1)
from the original Eisenberg-Noe network model.
Proposition 2.15. A fixed point p ∈ [0, p¯] of ΦRV+ is a clearing vector for (N ,pi, p¯,x, α, β).
Proof. Let p = (p1, . . . , pn)
T be a fixed point of ΦRV+. To show that p is a clearing vector for
(N ,pi, p¯,x, α, β), let i ∈ N .
If p¯i ≤ xi+
∑n
j=1 πjipj, then Φ
RV+
i (p) = p¯i = pi ≤ xi+
∑n
j=1 πjipj, and if p¯i > xi+
∑n
j=1 πjipj ,
then Φ
RV+
i (p) = αxi+β
∑n
j=1 πjipj = pi ≤ xi+
∑n
j=1 πjipj, by the definition of Φ
RV+ in (2.13) and
since p is a fixed point of ΦRV+ . Hence, both limited liability and absolute priority in Definition 2.14
hold. Hence, p is a clearing vector for (N ,pi, p¯,x, α, β).
Remark 2.16. The converse of Proposition 2.15 fails to hold in general. Here is a counterexample.
Consider a Rogers-Veraart network (N ,pi, p¯,x, α, β) and payment vector p, where N = {1, 2},
pi =
[
0 1
1 0
]
, p¯ =
[
20
25
]
, x =
[
10
10
]
, p =
[
20
15
]
,
α = 0.5, β = 0.5. According to Definition 2.14, p is a clearing vector for (N ,pi, p¯,x, α, β) since
it satisfies absolute priority and limited liability. However, by (2.13), Φ
RV+
2 (p) = 25 > p2 = 15.
Hence, p is not a fixed point of ΦRV+ .
The next theorem is the main result of Section 2.3. In the spirit of Theorem 2.7 for a signed
Eisenberg-Noe network, it provides a MILP characterization of clearing vectors for the Rogers-
Veraart nework (N ,pi, p¯,x, α, β).
Theorem 2.17. Let ΛRV+ : Rn → R be a MILP aggregation function defined by
ΛRV+ (y) :=


sup
{
f (p) | p ≤ αy + βpiTp+ p¯⊙ s,
p¯⊙ s ≤ y + piTp,p ∈ [0, p¯] , s ∈ {0, 1}n
}
,
if y ∈ Rn+,
−∞, if y /∈ Rn+,
(2.14)
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where f : Rn → R is a strictly increasing linear function. If (p, s) is an optimal solution to the
MILP for ΛRV+ (x), then p is a clearing vector for (N ,pi, p¯,x, α, β).
Remark 2.18. ΛRV+ fails to be concave in general.
Remark 2.19. Let us comment on the MILP problems in Theorem 2.7 and Theorem 2.17. While
both problems have a discrete feature through the binary variables, the natures of this feature are
quite different from each other. In Theorem 2.7, the binary variables serve for quantifying the
switch from the “first round” to the “second round” in the definition of ΦEN, which is described
above Definition 2.5. In this case, in addition to the binary variables, one also uses a large constant
M in the problem formulation. On the other hand, binary variables are used in Theorem 2.17 to
model the discontinuity in ΦRV+ which occurs when α < 1 or β < 1. In this case, a formulation
without using a large constant M is possible.
Note that ΛRV+ (x) can be written more explicitly as
maximize f (p) (2.15)
subject to pi ≤ αxi + β
n∑
j=1
πjipj + p¯isi, i ∈ N , (2.16)
p¯isi ≤ xi +
n∑
j=1
πjipj, i ∈ N , (2.17)
0 ≤ pi ≤ p¯i, i ∈ N , (2.18)
si ∈ {0, 1} i ∈ N . (2.19)
It is easy to check that (p, s) = (0,0) ∈ Rn × Zn is a feasible solution to the MILP in (2.15).
Moreover, since f is a bounded function on the interval [0, p¯] ⊆ Rn+, by Meyer (1974, Theorem 2.1),
the MILP in (2.15) has an optimal solution. Observe that, by Theorem 2.17, the existence of an
optimal solution to the MILP in (2.15) proves the existence of a clearing vector for (N ,pi, p¯,x, α, β).
Hence, Theorem 2.17 provides an alternative argument for the proof of Rogers and Veraart (2013,
Theorem 3.1) on the existence of a clearing vector.
The proof of Theorem 2.17 relies on the following three lemmata.
Lemma 2.20. Let (p, s) be an optimal solution to the MILP for ΛRV+ (x). Let i ∈ N such that
αxi + β
n∑
j=1
πjipj < p¯i ≤ xi +
n∑
j=1
πjipj.
Then, si = 1.
Lemma 2.21. Let (p, s) be an optimal solution to the MILP for ΛRV+ (x). Let i ∈ N with
p¯i ≤ xi +
∑n
j=1 πjipj. Then, pi = p¯i.
Lemma 2.22. Let (p, s) be an optimal solution to the MILP for ΛRV+ (x). Let i ∈ N with
p¯i > xi +
∑n
j=1 πjipj. Then, pi = αxi + β
∑n
j=1 πjipj .
The proofs of Lemmata 2.20, 2.21, 2.22 can be found in Appendices A.2, A.3, A.4, respectively.
Proof of Theorem 2.17. Let (p, s) be an optimal solution to the MILP for ΛRV+ (x). To prove
that p is a clearing vector, thanks to Proposition 2.15, it suffices to show ΦRV+ (p) = p.
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Let us fix i ∈ N . Recalling (2.13), we consider two cases:
(1) p¯i ≤ xi +
n∑
j=1
πjipj , (2) p¯i > xi +
n∑
j=1
πjipj.
(1) Assume that p¯i ≤ xi+
∑n
j=1 πjipj. Then, by (2.13), Φ
RV+
i (p) = p¯i. By Lemma 2.21, pi = p¯i.
Hence, pi = p¯i = Φ
RV+
i (p).
(2) Assume that p¯i > xi+
∑n
j=1 πjipj. Then, by Definition (2.13), Φ
RV+
i (p) = αxi+β
∑n
j=1 πjipj .
By Lemma 2.22, pi = αxi + β
∑n
j=1 πjipj. Hence, pi = αxi + β
∑n
j=1 πjipj = Φ
RV+
i (p).
Therefore, p is a clearing vector.
The MILP aggregation functions ΛEN and ΛRV+ developed in this section are used in Section 3
to define and calculate systemic risk measures.
3 Optimization problems for systemic risk measures
In this section, we consider the computation of the (sensitive) systemic risk measures studied
in Feinstein et al. (2017), Biagini et al. (2018), Ararat and Rudloff (2016), which are set-valued
functionals of a random operating cash flow vector and defined in terms of the aggregation function
of the underlying network model. While the aforementioned articles focus mainly on the case where
the aggregation function is concave which results in the convex-valuedness of the corresponding
systemic risk measure, the aggregation functions we use are not concave and the corresponding
systemic risk measures fail to have convex values, in general.
We are mainly interested in the systemic risk measures for the signed Eisenberg-Noe and Rogers-
Veraart network models. We follow a unifying approach by using a general aggregation function
defined in terms of a mixed-integer optimization problem. To be able to approximate the non-
convex values of the corresponding systemic risk measure, we associate a (generally nonconvex)
vector optimization problem to it. We solve this problem by the recent Benson-type algorithm in
Nobakhtian and Shafiei (2017) (Section 3.3). For this purpose, we study two families of (scalar)
optimization problems: the weighted-sum scalarization problem (Section 3.1) and the problem of
calculating the minimum step-length to enter a set with a fixed direction (Section 3.2). We prove
that both problems in both models can be formulated as MILP problems. We also prove some
results related to the feasibility and boundedness of these MILP problems.
Without specifying a particular network model, we consider a financial network with n ∈ N
institutions. As in Section 2, we write N = {1, . . . , n}. Similarly, let K = {1, . . . ,K} for some
K ∈ N. We consider a finite probability space (Ω,F ,P), where Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωK}, F is the power set
of Ω, and P is a probability measure determined by the elementary probabilities qk := P
{
ωk
}
> 0,
k ∈ K. We denote by L (Rn) the linear space of all random vectors X : Ω → Rn. For every
X ∈ L (Rn), let
‖X‖∞ := max
i∈N , k∈K
∣∣∣Xi(ωk)∣∣∣ .
We use the notion of grouping, also discussed in Feinstein et al. (2017), to keep the dimension
of the systemic risk measure at a reasonable level for computational purposes. This notion allows
one to categorize the members of the network into groups and assign the same capital level for all
the members of a group. To that end, let G ≥ 1 be an integer denoting the number of groups
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and G = {1, . . . , G} the set of groups in the network. For the computations in Section 4, we will
use G = 2 or G = 3 groups. Let (Nℓ)ℓ∈G be a partition of N , where Nℓ denotes the set of all
institutions that belong to group ℓ ∈ G. For each ℓ ∈ G, let nℓ := |Nℓ| and Bℓ ∈ RG×nℓ the matrix
having 1’s in the ℓth row and 0’s elsewhere:
Bℓ :=


0 . . . 0
...
. . .
...
1 . . . 1
...
. . .
...
0 . . . 0


.
Let B ∈ RG×n be the grouping matrix defined by
B :=
[
B1 B2 . . . BG
]
. (3.1)
We consider the (grouped) sensitive systemic risk measure ROPT : L(Rn)→ 2Rn defined by
ROPT (X) :=
{
z ∈ Rn | ΛOPT(X +BTz) ∈ A
}
, (3.2)
where ΛOPT : Rn → R∪{−∞} is an aggregation function and A ⊆ L(Rn) is an acceptance set, that
is, the set of all random aggregate outputs that are at an acceptable level of risk. We assume that
ΛOPT is a general optimization aggregation function of the form
ΛOPT (x) := sup {f (p) | (p, s) ∈ Y (x) ,p ∈ Rn, s ∈ Zn} , (3.3)
where f : Rn → R is a strictly increasing and continuous function, and Y : Rn → 2Rn×Zn is a set-
valued constraint function such that Y (x) is either the empty set or a nonempty compact set for
every x ∈ Rn. In particular, this general structure covers the aggregation functions ΛOPT = ΛEN
and ΛOPT = ΛRV+ defined in Section 2. On the other hand, we assume that A is a halfspace-type
acceptance set defined by
A = {Y ∈ L (Rn) | E [Y ] ≥ γ} , (3.4)
where γ ∈ R is some suitable threshold. Hence, the corresponding systemic risk measure ROPT
becomes
ROPT (X) =
{
z ∈ RG | E
[
ΛOPT(X +BTz)
]
≥ γ
}
. (3.5)
We write ROPT = REN when ΛOPT = ΛEN and ROPT = RRV+ when ΛOPT = ΛRV+ , and refer
to them as the Eisenberg-Noe and Rogers-Veraart systemic risk measures, respectively.
Remark 3.1. For RRV+(X), the definition of ΛRV+ in (2.14) implies the implicit condition X +
BTz ≥ 0.
Next, we introduce a vector optimization problem associated to each value of ROPT. Let us fix
X ∈ L(Rn) and consider the vector optimization problem
minimize z ∈ RG with respect to ≤
subject to E
[
ΛOPT(X +BTz)
]
≥ γ, (3.6)
where ≤ denotes the usual componentwise ordering in Rn. Note that ROPT (X) coincides with the
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so-called upper image of this vector optimization problem in the sense that
ROPT (X) =
{
z + RG+ | E
[
ΛOPT(X +BTz)
]
≥ γ
}
. (3.7)
In general, due to the lack of concavity for ΛOPT, the set ROPT (X) may fail to be convex (see Re-
marks 2.8,2.18). While the majority of the Benson-type approximation algorithms in the literature
(Benson (1998), Hamel et al. (2014), Lo¨hne et al. (2014)) work for linear/convex vector optimiza-
tion problems and are based on creating supporting halfspaces for the upper image, we use the
more recent Benson-type algorithm proposed in Nobakhtian and Shafiei (2017), which works for
nonconvex upper images and is based on creating sets of the form “point plus cone.” The algorithm
relies on the assumption that the associated weighted-sum scalarization and minimum step-length
problems can be solved to optimality. In the next two subsections, we propose methods to solve
these problems in our case by exploiting the structure of the optimization aggregation function
ΛOPT.
3.1 Weighted-sum scalarizations of systemic risk measures
For each w ∈ RG+\ {0}, we consider the weighted-sum scalarization problem
P1 (w) = inf
z∈ROPT(X)
wTz = inf
z∈RG
{
wTz | E
[
ΛOPT(X +BTz)
]
≥ γ
}
. (3.8)
The following theorem provides an alternative formulation for P1 (w).
Theorem 3.2. Let w ∈ RG+\ {0}. Consider the problem in (3.8) and let
Z1 (w) := inf
z∈RG
{
wTz |
∑
k∈K
qkf(pk) ≥ γ,
(pk, sk) ∈ Y(X(ωk) +BTz),pk ∈ Rn, sk ∈ Zn ∀k ∈ K
}
.
(3.9)
Then, P1 (w) = Z1 (w). In particular, if one of the problems in (3.8) and (3.9) has a finite optimal
value, then so does the other one and the optimal values coincide.
Proof. Let (z, (pk, sk)k∈K) be a feasible solution for the problem in (3.9). Then, for each k ∈ K,
(pk, sk) is a feasible solution to ΛOPT(X(ωk) +BTz) in (3.3) because the optimization problem in
(3.9) includes the constraints of (3.3). Hence, for every k ∈ K,
ΛOPT(X(ωk) +BTz) ≥ f(pk),
which implies
E
[
ΛOPT(X +BTz)
]
≥
K∑
k=1
qkf(pk) ≥ γ,
where the second inequality holds by feasibility of (z, (pk, sk)k∈K). Hence, z is a feasible solution
for the problem in (3.8). So P1 (w) ≤ Z1 (w).
Conversely, let
•
z be a feasible solution for the problem in (3.8). For each k ∈ K, there exists an
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optimal solution (
•
pk,
•
sk) to the problem for ΛOPT(X(ωk) +BT
•
z). Then,
K∑
k=1
qkf(
•
pk) = E
[
ΛOPT(X +BT
•
z)
]
≥ γ,
by the definition of P1 (w). Hence, ( •z, ( •pk, •sk)k∈K) is a feasible solution for the problem in (3.9).
So P1 (w) ≥ Z1 (w).
Remark 3.3. Let ℓ ∈ G and eℓ the corresponding standard unit vector in RG. Observe that the
weighted-sum scalarization problem
P1(eℓ) = inf
z∈RG
{
zℓ | E
[
ΛOPT(X +BTz)
]
≥ γ
}
(3.10)
is a single-objective optimization problem of the vector optimization problem in (3.6). By Theo-
rem 3.2, P1
(
eℓ
)
= Z1
(
eℓ
)
.
Remark 3.4. Let zideal ∈ RG be the ideal point of the vector optimization problem in (3.6) in the
sense that the entries of zideal minimize each of the objective functions of the vector optimization
problem. In other words, one can define
zideal :=
(P1 (e1) , . . . ,P1 (eG))T ∈ RG (3.11)
assuming that P1
(
eℓ
)
is finite for each ℓ ∈ G. Theorem 3.2 allows one to solve G optimization
problems with compact feasible sets, namely, the problems
(Z1 (eℓ))ℓ∈G , to obtain the ideal point
of the vector optimization problem in (3.6).
In the following two subsections, we apply Theorem 3.2 to the special cases ΛOPT = ΛEN and
ΛOPT = ΛRV+ , respectively. For this purpose, we fix the function f : Rn → R in the objective
functions of the MILP aggregation functions as
f(p) := 1Tp.
It is clear that f is a strictly increasing continuous linear function bounded on the interval [0, p¯] ⊆
R
n. Moreover, since the vector optimization algorithm in Section 3.3 requires solving weighted-sum
scalarization problems only for the standard unit vectors, we state our results for such direction
vectors.
3.1.1 Weighted-sum scalarizations of Eisenberg-Noe systemic risk measure
Let (N ,pi, p¯,X) be a signed Eisenberg-Noe network.
Corollary 3.5. Let ℓ ∈ G. Consider the single-objective optimization problem
PEN1 (eℓ) := inf
z∈RG
{
zℓ | E
[
ΛEN(X +BTz)
]
≥ γ
}
, (3.12)
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and let
ZEN1 (eℓ) := inf
z∈RG
{
zℓ |
∑
k∈K
qk1Tpk ≥ γ,
pk ≤
(
ΠTpk + (X(ωk) +BTz) +M(1− sk)
)
∧ (p¯⊙ sk),
ΠTpk + (X(ωk) +BTz) ≤Msk,
pk ∈ [0, p¯] , sk ∈ {0, 1}n ∀k ∈ K
}
,
(3.13)
where M = 2 ‖X‖∞ + (n+ 1) ‖p¯‖∞. Then, PEN1 (eℓ) = ZEN1 (eℓ). In particular, if one of the
problems in (3.12) and (3.13) has a finite optimal value, then so does the other one and the optimal
values coincide.
Proof. Let YEN : Rn → 2Rn×Zn be a set-valued function defined by
YEN (x) :=
{
(p, s) ∈ Rn × Zn | p ≤
[
ΠTp+ x+M (1− s)
]
∧ (p¯⊙ s) ,
ΠTp+ x ≤Ms, p ∈ [0, p¯] , s ∈ {0, 1}n
}
.
(3.14)
Then, applying Theorem 3.2 with Y = YEN gives PEN1 (eℓ) = ZEN1 (eℓ).
The next three propositions present some boundedness and feasibility results for the MILP
problem of computing ZEN1 (eℓ), ℓ ∈ G, in (3.13).
Proposition 3.6. Let ℓ ∈ G. If the problem in (3.13) has an optimal solution, then
PEN1 (eℓ) = ZEN1 (eℓ) ≤ ‖X‖∞ + ‖p¯‖∞ .
Proposition 3.7. Let ℓ ∈ G. If the problem in (3.13) has a feasible solution, then it has a finite
optimal value, that is, ZEN1
(
eℓ
) ∈ R.
Proposition 3.8. Let ℓ ∈ G. The problem in (3.13) has a feasible solution if and only if γ ≤ 1Tp¯.
The proofs of Propositions 3.6, 3.7, 3.8 can be found in Appendices B.1, B.2, B.3, respectively.
Remark 3.9. Let ℓ ∈ G. Suppose that there exists an optimal solution (z, (pk, sk)k∈K) of the
MILP problem in (3.13). By the structure of the matrix B, for each i ∈ N , it holds (BTz)
i
= zt for
some t ∈ G. Hence, by Proposition 3.6, (BTz)i ≤ ‖X‖∞+ ‖p¯‖∞ holds for each i ∈ N . In addition,
for every i ∈ N , k ∈ K, and pk ∈ [0, p¯], it holds ∑nj=1 πjipkj < n ‖p¯‖∞ and Xi (ωk) ≤ ‖X‖∞.
Hence, the choice of M = 2 ‖X‖∞ + (n+ 1) ‖p¯‖∞ in Corollary 3.5 is justified, since, to ensure the
feasibility of the third constraint in (3.13), it is enough to choose M such that
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j + (Xi(ω
k) + (BTz)i) ≤M
for every i ∈ N , k ∈ K and pk ∈ [0, p¯].
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3.1.2 Weighted-sum scalarizations of Rogers-Veraart systemic risk measure
Let (N ,pi, p¯,X , α, β) be a Rogers-Veraart network.
Corollary 3.10. Let ℓ ∈ G. Consider the single-objective optimization problem
PRV+1 (eℓ) := inf
z∈RG
{
zℓ | E
[
ΛRV+(X +BTz)
]
≥ γ
}
, (3.15)
and let
ZRV+1 (eℓ) := inf
z∈RG
{
zℓ |
∑
k∈K
qk1Tpk ≥ γ,
pk ≤ α
(
X(ωk) +BTz
)
+ βΠTpk + p¯⊙ sk,
p¯⊙ sk ≤
(
X(ωk) +BTz
)
+ΠTpk,
X(ωk) +BTz ≥ 0, pk ∈ [0, p¯] , sk ∈ {0, 1}n ∀k ∈ K
}
.
(3.16)
Then, PRV+1
(
eℓ
)
= ZRV+1
(
eℓ
)
. In particular, if one of the problems in (3.15) and (3.16) has a finite
optimal value, then so does the other one and the optimal values coincide.
Proof. Let YRV+ : Rn → 2R
n×Zn be a set-valued function defined by
YRV+ (x) :=
{
(p, s) ∈ Rn × Zn | p ≤ αx+ βΠTp+ p¯⊙ s,
p¯⊙ s ≤ x+ΠTp,p ∈ [0, p¯] , s ∈ {0, 1}n
}
.
(3.17)
for each x ∈ Rn+ and YRV+(x) = ∅ for each x ∈ Rn \ Rn+. Then, applying Theorem 3.2 with
Y = YRV+ gives PRV+1
(
eℓ
)
= ZRV+1
(
eℓ
)
.
The next three propositions present some boundedness and feasibility results for the MILP
problem of computing ZRV+1 (eℓ), ℓ ∈ G, in (3.16).
Proposition 3.11. Let ℓ ∈ G. If the problem in (3.16) has an optimal solution, then
PRV+1 (eℓ) = ZRV+1 (eℓ) ≤ ‖X‖∞ +
1
α
‖p¯‖∞ .
Proposition 3.12. Let ℓ ∈ G. If the problem in (3.16) has a feasible solution, then it has a finite
optimal value, that is, ZRV+1
(
eℓ
) ∈ R.
Proposition 3.13. Let ℓ ∈ G. The problem in (3.16) has a feasible solution if and only if γ ≤ 1Tp¯.
The proofs of Propositions 3.11, 3.12 and 3.13 can be found in Appendices B.4, B.5 and B.6,
respectively.
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3.2 Minimum step-length function
Weighted-sum scalarizations are used to calculate supporting halfspaces for the value of a systemic
risk measure and they can be sufficient to characterize the entire risk set when the set is convex.
In our nonconvex case, we make use of additional scalarizations that are used to calculate the
minimum step-lengths to the enter the risk set from possibly outside points. Such scalarizations
are well-known in vector optimization; see Gerstewitz and Iwanow (1985), Go¨pfert et al. (2003),
for instance.
For each v ∈ RG, we consider
P2 (v) := inf
{
µ ∈ R | BTv + µ1 ∈ ROPT (X)
}
= inf
{
µ ∈ R | E
[
ΛOPT(X +BTv + µ1)
]
≥ γ
}
, (3.18)
which can be interpreted as the minimum step-length in the direction 1 from the point v to the
boundary of the set ROPT (X).
The following theorem provides an alternative formulation for P2 (v).
Theorem 3.14. Let v ∈ Rn. Consider the problem in (3.18) and let
Z2 (v) := inf
{
µ ∈ R |
∑
k∈K
qkf(pk) ≥ γ,
(pk, sk) ∈ Y(X(ωk) +BTv + µ1), pk ∈ Rn, sk ∈ Zn ∀k ∈ K
}
.
(3.19)
Then, P2 (v) = Z2 (v). In particular, if one of the problems in (3.18) and (3.19) has a finite optimal
value, then so does the other one and the optimal values coincide.
Proof. Let (µ, (pk, sk)k∈K) be a feasible solution of the problem in (3.19). For each k ∈ K, (pk, sk)
is a feasible solution to ΛOPT(X
(
ωk
)
+BTv+µ1) in (3.3) because the problem in (3.19) includes
the constraints of (3.3). Hence, for each k ∈ K,
ΛOPT(X(ωk) +BTv + µ1) ≥ f(pk),
which implies
E
[
ΛOPT(X +BTv + µ1)
]
≥
K∑
k=1
qkf(pk) ≥ γ,
where the second inequality holds by feasibility of (µ, (pk, sk)k∈K). Then, µ is a feasible solution
for the problem in (3.18). Hence, P2 (v) ≤ Z2 (v).
Conversely, let
•
µ ∈ R be a feasible solution for the problem in (3.18). Then, for each k ∈ K,
ΛOPT(X(ωk)+BTv+
•
µ1) ∈ R and, by the compactness of Y(X(ωk)+BTv+ •µ1), there exists an
optimal solution (
•
pk,
•
sk) for the problem ΛOPT(X(ωk) +BTv +
•
µ1) in (3.3). Then,
K∑
k=1
qkf(
•
pk) = E
[
ΛOPT(X +BTv +
•
µ1)
]
≥ γ
by the definition of P2 (v). Hence, ( •µ, ( •pk, •sk)k∈K) is a feasible solution for the problem in (3.19).
Hence, P2 (v) ≥ Z2 (v).
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The following two sections apply Theorem 3.14 to the special cases ΛOPT = ΛEN and ΛOPT =
ΛRV+ , respectively.
3.2.1 Minimum step-length function for Eisenberg-Noe systemic risk measure
Let (N ,pi, p¯,X) be an Eisenberg-Noe network.
Corollary 3.15. Let v ∈ RG. Consider the problem
PEN2 (v) := inf
{
µ ∈ R | E
[
ΛEN(X +BTv + µ1)
]
≥ γ
}
, (3.20)
and let
ZEN2 (v) := inf
{
µ ∈ R |
∑
k∈K
qk1Tpk ≥ γ,
pk ≤
(
ΠTpk + (X(ωk) +BTv + µ1) +M(1− sk)
)
∧ (p¯⊙ sk),
ΠTpk + (X(ωk) +BTv + µ1) ≤Msk,
pk ∈ [0, p¯] , sk ∈ {0, 1}n ∀k ∈ K
}
,
(3.21)
where M = 2 ‖X‖∞ + 2 ‖v‖∞ + (n+ 1) ‖p¯‖∞. Then, PEN2 (v) = ZEN2 (v). In particular, if one of
the problems in (3.20) and (3.21) has a finite optimal value, then so does the other one and the
optimal values coincide.
Proof. Let Y = YEN as in the proof of Corollary 3.5. Then, applying Theorem 3.14 gives PEN2 (v) =
ZEN2 (v).
The next three propositions present some boundedness and feasibility results for the MILP
problem in (3.21).
Proposition 3.16. Let v ∈ RG. If the problem in (3.21) has an optimal solution, then
PEN2 (v) = ZEN2 (v) ≤ ‖X‖∞ + ‖v‖∞ + ‖p¯‖∞ .
Proposition 3.17. Let v ∈ RG. If the problem in (3.21) has a feasible solution, then it has a finite
optimal value, that is, ZEN2 (v) ∈ R.
Proposition 3.18. Let v ∈ RG. The problem in (3.21) has a feasible solution if and only if
γ ≤ 1Tp¯.
The proofs of Propositions 3.16, 3.17, 3.18 are presented in Appendices B.7, B.8, B.9, respec-
tively.
Remark 3.19. Let v ∈ RG and (µ, (pk, sk)k∈K) an optimal solution of the MILP problem in (3.21).
By Proposition (3.16), µ ≤ ‖X‖∞ + ‖v‖∞ + ‖p¯‖∞. By the structure of the matrix B, for each
i ∈ N , it holds (BTv)i = vt for some t ∈ G. Hence, for every v ∈ RG, (BTv)i ≤ ‖v‖∞. In addition,
for every i ∈ N , k ∈ K, and pk ∈ [0, p¯], it holds ∑nj=1 πjipkj < n ‖p¯‖∞ and Xi(ωk) ≤ ‖X‖∞.
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Hence, the choice of M as M = 2 ‖X‖∞ + 2 ‖v‖∞ + (n+ 1) ‖p¯‖∞ in Corollary 3.15 is justified,
since, to ensure the feasibility of the third constraint in (3.21), it is enough to choose M such that
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j +
(
Xi(ω
k) + (BTv)i + µ
)
≤M
for every i ∈ N , k ∈ K, v ∈ RG and pk ∈ [0, p¯].
Remark 3.20. Proposition 3.7 shows that if the MILP problem ZEN1
(
eℓ
)
in (3.13) is feasible for
every ℓ ∈ G, then the ideal point zideal ∈ Rn exists for the vector optimization problem in (3.6)
with ΛOPT = ΛEN. Proposition 3.12 provides the same result for the vector optimization problem
in (3.6) with ΛOPT = ΛRV+. In addition, the results of Propositions 3.6, 3.7, 3.16 and 3.17 allow
one to choose the exact value for the upper bound M in the corresponding MILP problems instead
of assuming some heuristic values.
3.2.2 Minimum step-length function for Rogers-Veraart systemic risk measure
Let (N ,pi, p¯,X , α, β) be a Rogers-Veraart network.
Corollary 3.21. Let v ∈ RG. Consider the problem
PRV+2 (v) := inf
{
µ ∈ R | E
[
ΛRV+(X +BTv + µ1)
]
≥ γ
}
, (3.22)
and let
ZRV+2 (v) := inf
{
µ ∈ R |
∑
k∈K
qk1Tpk ≥ γ,
pk ≤ α
(
X(ωk) +BTv + µ1
)
+ βΠTpk + p¯⊙ sk,
p¯⊙ sk ≤ (X(ωk) +BTv + µ1) +ΠTpk,
X(ωk) +BTv + µ1 ≥ 0,
pk ∈ [0, p¯] , sk ∈ {0, 1}n ∀k ∈ K
}
.
(3.23)
Then, PRV+2 (v) = ZRV+2 (v). In particular, if one of the problems in (3.22) and (3.23) has a finite
optimal value, then so does the other one and the optimal values coincide.
Proof. Let Y = YRV+ as in the proof of Corollary 3.10. By Theorem 3.14, the result follows.
The next three propositions present some boundedness and feasibility results for the problem
in (3.23).
Proposition 3.22. Let v ∈ RG. If the problem in (3.23) has an optimal solution, then
PRV+2 (v) = ZRV+2 (v) ≤ ‖X‖∞ + ‖v‖∞ +
1
α
‖p¯‖∞ .
Proposition 3.23. Let v ∈ RG. If the problem in (3.23) has a feasible solution, then it has a finite
optimal value, that is ZRV+2 (v) ∈ R.
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Proposition 3.24. Let v ∈ RG. The problem in (3.23) has a feasible solution if and only if
γ ≤ 1Tp¯.
The proofs of Propositions 3.22, 3.23, 3.24 can be found in Appendices B.10, B.11, B.12, re-
spectively
Remark 3.25. For ℓ ∈ G and v ∈ RG, the threshold γ appearing in REN, RRV+ can be taken as
some percentage of 1Tp¯, the sum of the debts of all nodes in the network. Then this threshold
ensures that the expected total amount of payments exceeds this fraction of the total debt in the
system. Indeed, Corollaries 3.8, 3.13, 3.18, 3.24 show that the MILP problems for calculating
ZEN1
(
eℓ
)
, ZRV+1
(
eℓ
)
, ZEN2 (v), ZRV+2 (v) are feasible if and only if γ ≤ 1Tp¯. Hence, this choice of
γ is justified.
3.3 The nonconvex Benson-type algorithm
In this section, we present an algorithm that approximates the Eisenberg-Noe and Rogers-Veraart
systemic risk measures. The risk measures are approximated with respect to a user-defined ap-
proximation error ǫ > 0 and an upper bound point zUB ∈ RG. The algorithm is based on
the Benson-type algorithm for nonconvex multi-objective programming problems described in
Nobakhtian and Shafiei (2017). The following definitions are borrowed from Nobakhtian and Shafiei
(2017).
Let L ⊆ RG. A point v ∈ L is called a vertex of L if there exists a neighborhood N of v for
which v cannot be expressed as a strict convex combination of two distinct points in L ∩N . The
set of all vertices of L is denoted by vertL. The notation intL denotes the interior of L. Given a
point z ∈ RG and L ⊆ RG, we define L|z := {v ∈ L | v ≤ z}.
Let R,L,U ⊆ RG, z ∈ RG and ǫ > 0 be given. The set L is called an outer approximation for
R with respect to ǫ and z, if R ⊆ L and L|z ⊆ R+B (0, ǫ), where B (0, ǫ) is the closed ball in RG
centered at 0 with radius ǫ. The set U is called an inner approximation for R with respect to ǫ and
z if R is an outer approximation for U with respect to ǫ and z.
The algorithm that calculates inner and outer approximations of a systemic risk measure works
as follows. It is provided in detail only for the Eisenberg-Noe systemic risk measures, since it works
similarly for the Rogers-Veraart systemic risk measures. Let (N ,pi, p¯,X) be a signed Eisenberg-
Noe network. Let G be the number of groups in the network and G = {1, . . . , G}. Consider the
corresponding Eisenberg-Noe systemic risk measure REN (X). Let zideal ∈ RG be the ideal point of
the vector optimization problem in (3.6) with ΛOPT = ΛEN, see Remark 3.4 for its definition. One
can calculate zideal =
(ZEN1 (e1) , . . . ,ZEN1 (eG))T by Corollary 3.5. In addition, for v ∈ RG, the
minimum step-length PEN2 (v) can be obtained by solving the MILP problem ZEN2 (v) in (3.21), by
Corollary 3.15.
The algorithm starts with the initial inner approximation U0 := zUB+RG+ and the initial outer
approximation L0 := zideal + RG+, which satisfy U0 ⊆ REN (X) ⊆ L0. Let ε = ǫ1 and initially set
t← 0. At the tth iteration, for a vertex vt ∈ (vertLt|zUB) such that vt + ε /∈ int U t, the algorithm
solves ZEN2
(
vt
)
to obtain the minimum step-length µt from the point vt to the boundary of REN (X)
in the direction 1 ∈ RG. In other words, yt = vt + µt1 is a boundary point of the set REN (X).
Then the algorithm excludes the cone yt−RG+ from Lt to obtain Lt+1 by Lt+1 := Lt\
(
yt − RG+
)
, and
adds the cone yt+RG+ to U t to obtain U t+1 as follows: U t+1 := U t ∪
(
yt + RG+
)
. Therefore, at each
step of the algorithm, we have U t ⊆ U t+1 ⊆ REN (X) ⊆ Lt+1 ⊆ Lt. At the end of the tth iteration,
vertLt+1 is computed. The computation of vertLt+1 is described in detail in Gourion and Luc
(2010). The above process repeats for t ← t + 1. The algorithm stops at T th iteration, when(
vertLT |zUB
)
+ε ⊆ int UT . The sets UT and LT are the inner and outer approximations for REN(X)
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with respect to ǫ > 0 and zUB ∈ RG. Note that zUB has to be chosen such that zUB ∈ REN (X) to
get nonempty approximations. The pseudocode of the algorithm for the Eisenberg-Noe systemic
risk measures is provided in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1. Inner and outer approximation algorithm for REN (X)
Initialization.
(i1) Let zUB ∈ REN (X), L0 = zideal + RG+, U0 = zUB + RG+ and ǫ > 0.
(i2) Put ε = ǫ1 and set t← 0, S ← ∅.
Iteration steps.
(k1) If (vertLt|
z
UB) ⊆ S, then set T = t and stop. Otherwise, choose
vt ∈ (vertLt|
z
UB) \S.
(k2) If vt + ε ∈ int U t, then set S ← S ∪ {vt} and go to (k1).
(k3) Suppose that µt = PEN2 (vt). Define yt = vt + µt1.
(k4) Define Lt+1 := Lt\ (yt − RG+) and U t+1 := U t ∪ (yt + RG+).
(k5) Determine vertLt+1 and set t← t+ 1. Go to (k1).
Results.
(r1) LT is an outer approximation and UT is an inner approximation for REN (X).
4 Computational results and analysis
In this section, we present some computational results to illustrate the approximation of the
Eisenberg-Noe and Rogers-Veraart systemic risk measures by the Benson-type algorithm described
in Section 3.3. We implement the algorithm on Java Photon (Release 4.8.0) calling Gurobi Interac-
tive Shell (Version 7.5.2) and run it on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4790 processor with 3.60 GHz and
4 GB RAM. We approximate the Eisenberg-Noe and Rogers-Veraart systemic risk measures within
a two-group framework and perform a detailed sensitivity analysis. In the last part, we present
several computational results for three-group networks.
Recall that n is the number of institutions in a financial system, refered to as banks here,
nℓ is the number of nodes in a group ℓ ∈ G, K is the number of scenarios, ǫ is a user-defined
approximation error and zUB is a user-defined upper-bound vector that limits the approximated
region of a systemic risk measure. Throughout the computation of systemic risk measures, except
for the Rogers-Veraart case in a three-group framework (Section 4.6), zUB is taken as
zUB = zideal + 2 ‖p¯‖∞ ,
where zideal is the ideal point of the corresponding systemic risk measure (Remark 3.4) for the case
γ = 1Tp¯, that is, when it is required that the expected total value of payments is at least as much
as the total amount of liabilities in the network.
For convenience, let us write γ = γp
(
1
Tp¯
)
, where γp ∈ [0, 1].
4.1 Data generation
We consider a network with n banks forming G = 2 or G = 3 groups. Recall that G = {1, . . . , G},
N = ⋃ℓ∈G Nℓ = {1, . . . , n}, and nℓ = |Nℓ|. When G = 2, the groups ℓ = 1 and ℓ = 2 correspond to
big and small banks, respectively. When G = 3, the groups ℓ = 1, ℓ = 2 and ℓ = 3 correspond to
big, medium and small banks, respectively.
In order to construct a signed Eisenberg-Noe network (N ,pi, p¯,X) and a Rogers-Veraart net-
work (N ,pi, p¯,X, α, β), the corresponding interbank liabilities matrix l := (lij)i,j∈N ∈ Rn×n+ and
the random operating cash flow vector X are generated in the following fashion. For l, we use
an Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graph model (Erdo¨s and Re´nyi, 1959), (Gilbert, 1959). First, we fix a
connectivity probabilities matrix qcon := (qcon
ℓ,ℓˆ
)
ℓ,ℓˆ∈G ∈ RG×G and an intergroup liabilities matrix
lgr := (lgr
ℓ,ℓˆ
)
ℓ,ℓˆ∈G ∈ RG×G. For any two banks i, j ∈ N with i ∈ Nℓ, j ∈ Nℓˆ and ℓ, ℓˆ ∈ G, qconℓ,ℓˆ
is interpreted as a probability that bank i owes lgr
ℓ,ℓˆ
amount to bank j. Then, the liability lij is
generated by the Bernoulli trial
lij =
{
lgr
ℓ,ℓˆ
, if Uij < q
con
ℓ,ℓˆ
,
0, otherwise,
where Uij is the realization of a continuous random variable with a standard uniform distribution
on a separate probability space. Then, the relative liabilities matrix pi and the total obligation
vector p¯ are calculated accordingly.
Recall that the operating cash flow vector X = (X1, . . . ,Xn) ∈ L (Rn) is a multivariate random
vector and Ω is a finite set of K scenarios. It is assumed that all scenarios are equally likely to
happen, the operating cash flows have a common standard deviation σ, and there is a common
correlation ̺ between any two operating cash flows. Then, each entry Xi, i ∈ N , is generated as a
random sample of size K as described below.
For the Eisenberg-Noe network, the mean values of operating cash flows in each group, ν :=
(νℓ)ℓ∈G, are fixed and the random vector X is generated from K instances of a Gaussian random
vector. For the Rogers-Veraart network, first, shape parameters κ := (κℓ)ℓ∈G and scale parameters
θ := (θℓ)ℓ∈G are fixed in accordance with the choices of σ, ̺ and then, X is generated from K
instances of a random vector whose cumulative distribution function is stated in terms of a Gaussian
copula with gamma marginal distributions with the chosen parameters. In particular, νℓ = κℓθℓ
and σ =
√
κℓθℓ for each ℓ ∈ G.
4.2 A two-group signed Eisenberg-Noe network with 50 nodes
We consider a two-group Eisenberg-Noe network with n = 50 banks that consists of n1 = 15 big
banks, n2 = 35 small banks. We take K = 100, σ = 100, ̺ = 0.05,
qcon =
[
0.9 0.3
0.7 0.5
]
, lgr =
[
10 5
8 5
]
, ν =
[−50 −100] .
In the corresponding Eisenberg-Noe systemic risk measure, we take γp = 0.7.
ǫ
Inner
approx.
vertices
Outer
approx.
vertices
P2
problems
Avg. time per
P2 prob.
(seconds)
Total algorithm
time (seconds)
Total algorithm
time (hours)
20 18 19 18 663.546 11944 3.318
10 35 36 35 541.419 18950 5.264
5 73 74 73 512.998 37449 10.403
1 394 395 394 492.597 194083 53.912
Table 1: Computational performance of the algorithm for a network of 15 big and 35 small banks,
100 scenarios and approximation errors ǫ ∈ {1, 5, 10, 20}.
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(a) ǫ = 20 (b) ǫ = 10
(c) ǫ = 5 (d) ǫ = 1
Figure 1: Zoomed inner approximations of the Eisenberg-Noe systemic risk measure for ǫ ∈
{1, 5, 10, 20}.
The Benson-type algorithm is run with four different approximation errors ǫ to demonstrate dif-
ferent inner approximation levels. Table 1 presents the computational performance of the algorithm
for ǫ ∈ {1, 5, 10, 20}. Figure 1 consists of the zoomed inner approximations.
One can easily observe from Figure 1 that as ǫ decreases the algorithm gives a more precise inner
approximation of the systemic risk measure. In addition, as the number of P2 problems increases,
the average computation time per P2 problem decreases. This may be attributed to the warm start
feature of the Gurobi solver. When a sequence of mixed-integer programming problems are solved,
the solver constructs an initial solution out of the previously obtained optimal solution. This feature
is explained in detail in Gurobi Optimizer Reference Manual (2018, Chapter 10.2, pp. 594-595).
In the rest of this section, we perform sensitivity analyses on this network with respect to the
connectivity probabilities between big and small banks and on the number of scenarios.
4.2.1 Connectivity probabilities
Connectivity probabilities play a major role in determining the topology of the network because they
define the existence of liabilities between the banks. We would like to identify the sensitivity of the
systemic risk measure with respect to the changes in the connectivity probability qcon1,2 corresponding
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qcon1,2
Inner
approx.
vertices
Outer
approx.
vertices
P2
problems
Avg. time per
P2 prob.
(seconds)
Total algorithm
time (seconds)
Total algorithm
time (hours)
0.1 279 280 358 294.07 105 277 29.244
0.3 394 395 394 492.597 194 083 53.912
0.5 360 361 360 556.795 200 447 55.680
0.7 364 365 364 633.644 230 647 64.069
0.9 377 378 377 772.76 291 331 80.925
Table 2: Computational performance of the algorithm for qcon1,2 ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9}.
to the liabilities of big banks to small banks, and the probability qcon2,1 corresponding to the liabilities
of small banks to big banks.
For the sensitivity analysis with respect to qcon1,2 , originally taken as q
con
1,2 = 0.3, we present in
Table 2 the computational performance of the algorithm for qcon1,2 ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9}. Figure 2
consists of the corresponding inner approximations.
Observe from Table 2 that the average time per P2 problem increases with qcon1,2 . This is the
case because as qcon1,2 increases, big and small banks in the network become more connected in terms
of liabilities. Hence, the corresponding MILP formulations of P2 problems need more time to be
solved. This seems to be the only factor behind the increase because most of the algorithm runtime
is devoted to solving P2 problems and the number of P2 problems in each case does not change
much.
It can be observed that, as qcon1,2 increases, the corresponding inner approximations of systemic
risk measures in Figure 2 shift from the top left corner towards the bottom right corner. It
can be interpreted as follows: as qcon1,2 increases, the first group, the group of big banks, loses
capital allocation options, while the second group, the group of small banks, gains a wider range
of capital allocation options. It can also be observed from Figure 2 that generating a network
with qcon1,2 = 0.1 results in a nonconvex Eisenberg-Noe systemic risk measure. However, for the
Figure 2: Inner approximations of the Eisenberg-Noe systemic risk measure for qcon1,2 ∈
{0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9}.
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qcon2,1
Inner
approx.
vertices
Outer
approx.
vertices
P2
problems
Avg. time per
P2 prob.
(seconds)
Total algorithm
time (seconds)
Total algorithm
time (hours)
0.1 257 258 257 233.243 59943 16.651
0.3 294 295 294 319.511 93936 26.093
0.5 328 329 328 377.398 123787 34.385
0.7 394 395 394 492.597 194083 53.912
0.9 435 436 512 487.547 249624 69.340
Table 3: Computational performance of the algorithm for qcon2,1 ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9}.
values qcon1,2 ∈ {0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9}, the corresponding Eisenberg-Noe systemic risk measures seem to
be convex sets. For these cases, there might be some breakpoint between 0.1 and 0.3 that switches
these Eisenberg-Noe systemic risk measures from a nonconvex shape to a convex one, meaning that,
whenever the probability qcon1,2 is less than this breakpoint, big banks are less likely to be liable to
small banks and have even more capital allocation options than they have in the other cases.
Next, for the sensitivity analysis with respect to qcon2,1 , we present in Table 3 the computational
performance of the algorithm for qcon2,1 ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9}. Figure 3 consists of the correspond-
ing inner approximations.
As in the previous sensitivity analysis, observe from Table 3 that the average time per P2
problem increases with qcon2,1 . Hence, it is another justification of the presumption that this happens
because with higher connectivity probabilities the network becomes more connected in terms of
liabilities and the corresponding MILP formulations of P2 problems need more time to be solved.
Note that as qcon2,1 increases, the inner approximations of the corresponding Eisenberg-Noe sys-
temic risk measures in Figure 3 shift from the bottom right corner towards the top left corner.
Conversely to the previous sensitivity analysis, it can be interpreted as follows: as qcon2,1 increases,
the first group gains a wider range of capital allocation options, while the second group loses cap-
ital allocation options. It can also be observed from Figure 3 that generating a network with
Figure 3: Inner approximations of the Eisenberg-Noe systemic risk measure for qcon2,1 ∈
{0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9}.
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KInner
approx.
vertices
Outer
approx.
vertices
P2
problems
Avg. time per
P2 prob.
(seconds)
Total algorithm
time (seconds)
Total algorithm
time (hours)
10 376 377 376 3.088 1 161 0.323
20 380 381 380 11.977 4 551 1.264
30 389 390 389 28.134 10 944 3.040
40 381 382 381 56.685 21 597 5.999
50 373 374 373 96.488 35 990 9.997
60 381 382 381 151.635 57 773 16.048
70 385 386 385 206.924 79 666 22.129
80 390 391 390 293.155 114 330 31.758
90 381 382 381 378.346 144 150 40.042
100 394 395 394 492.597 194 083 53.912
Table 4: Computational performance of the algorithm for K ∈ {10, 20, . . . , 100}.
qcon2,1 = 0.9 results in a nonconvex Eisenberg-Noe systemic risk measure. However, for the values
qcon2,1 ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7}, the corresponding Eisenberg-Noe systemic risk measures seem to be con-
vex sets. As in the previous sensitivity analysis, it can be presumed that for these cases there is
some breakpoint between 0.7 and 0.9 that switches these Eisenberg-Noe systemic risk measures
from a convex shape to a nonconvex one, meaning that, whenever the probability qcon2,1 is higher
than this breakpoint, small banks are more likely to be liable to big banks and the latter have even
more capital allocation options than they have in the other cases.
4.2.2 Number of scenarios
Figure 4: Inner approximations of the Eisenberg-Noe systemic risk measure for K ∈
{10, 20, . . . , 100}.
Next, we analyze how computation times and the corresponding systemic risk measures change
with the number K of scenarios. Since the network structure remains the same all the time, it is
expected that there will be no major changes in Eisenberg-Noe systemic risk measures. However,
since each scenario adds n continuous and n binary variables to the corresponding P2 problem and
its MILP formulation ZEN2 , given in (3.21), one would expect major changes in computation times.
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Figure 5: Scenarios-average time per P2 problem and scenarios-total algorithm time plots for the
signed Eisenberg-Noe network of 50 banks.
Table 4 shows the computational performance of the algorithm for K ∈ {10, 20, . . . , 100} and
Figure 4 provides the inner approximations of the corresponding Eisenberg-Noe systemic risk mea-
sures. Finally, the plots in Figure 5 suggest that the average time per P2 problem and the total
algorithm time increase faster than linearly with K. At the same time, it can be observed from
Figure 4 that the corresponding inner approximations of the Eisenberg-Noe systemic risk measures
do not change much. Hence, the results obtained justify the expectations.
4.3 A two-group signed Eisenberg-Noe network with 70 nodes
In this section, we consider an Eisenberg-Noe network (N ,pi, p¯,X) with n = 70, n1 = 10, n2 = 60,
K = 50, σ = 100, ̺ = 0.05 and
qcon =
[
0.7 0.1
0.5 0.5
]
, lgr =
[
10 5
8 5
]
, ν =
[−50 −100] .
In the corresponding Eisenberg-Noe systemic risk measure, we take γp = 0.9. The approximation
error in the algorithm is taken as ǫ = 1.
On this network, we perform sensitivity analyses with respect to the threshold γp, the distribu-
tion of nodes among groups, and the number of scenarios.
4.3.1 Threshold level
We investigate how the Eisenberg-Noe systemic risk measures and their computation times change
when the requirement that some fraction of the total amount of liabilities in the network should
be met on average gets more strict. Table 5 illustrates the computational performance of the
algorithm for γp ∈ {0.01, 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9, 0.95, 0.99, 1} and Figure 6 represents the corresponding
inner approximations of the Eisenberg-Noe systemic risk measures.
It can be noted from Table 5 that the average times per P2 problem are high for the values of
γp around 0.3, and the number of P2 problems are high for the values of γp around 0.5. These two
factors result in high total algorithm times for the values of γp around 0.4. In addition, it can be
observed that the difference between the number of inner and outer approximation vertices and the
number of P2 problems increase drastically for the values of γp around 0.5. This happens because
the boundaries of the corresponding Eisenberg-Noe systemic risk measures in Figure 6 contain
“flat” regions, which makes the algorithm solve more P2 problems without actually improving
the approximation. Observe from Figure 6 that as γp increases, each subsequent Eisenberg-Noe
systemic risk measure is contained in the previous one. This result is fully consistent with the
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γp
Inner
approx.
vertices
Outer
approx.
vertices
P2
problems
Avg. time per
P2 prob.
(seconds)
Total algorithm
time (seconds)
Total algorithm
time (hours)
0.01 376 377 376 3.088 1 161 0.323
0.1 210 210 437 305.389 133 455 37.071
0.2 145 146 727 492.418 357 988 99.441
0.3 90 91 893 560.268 500 320 138.978
0.4 87 88 1037 494.65 512 952 142.487
0.5 91 95 1099 448.063 492 421 136.784
0.6 94 95 1065 240.982 256 646 71.291
0.7 96 97 927 97.501 90 383 25.106
0.8 141 142 719 45.546 32 748 9.097
0.9 234 235 461 15.285 7 047 1.957
0.95 217 218 217 11.622 2 522 0.701
0.99 136 137 136 2.504 341 0.095
1.00 1 1 1 0.203 0.204 0
Table 5: Computational performance of the algorithm for γp ∈ {0.01, 0.1, . . . , 0.9, 0.95, 0.99, 1}.
corresponding Eisenberg-Noe systemic risk measure since capital allocations that are feasible at a
particular γp level are also feasible for any level lower than γp.
4.3.2 Distribution of nodes among groups
In this part, we perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to the distribution of nodes among the
groups for a fixed total number of nodes n = 70. We take the number of big banks n1 in the set
{5, 10, 20, . . . , 60, 65}. Then, the number of small banks is n2 = n − n1. The generated random
operating cash flows remain the same all the time, while the network structure changes at each run.
Figure 6: Inner approximations of the Eisenberg-Noe systemic risk measure for γp ∈
{0.01, 0.1, . . . , 0.9, 0.95, 0.99, 1}.
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Hence, the corresponding Eisenberg-Noe systemic risk measures are expected to vary significantly.
n1
Inner
approx.
vertices
Outer
approx.
vertices
P2
problems
Avg. time per
P2 prob.
(seconds)
Total algorithm
time (seconds)
Total algorithm
time (hours)
5 93 94 1096 16.88 18 501 5.139
10 234 235 461 15.285 7 047 1.957
20 209 210 209 38.512 8 049 2.236
30 201 202 201 45.225 9 090 2.525
40 213 214 213 55.444 11 809 3.280
50 250 251 250 61.329 15 332 4.259
60 403 404 639 79.577 50 850 14.125
65 205 206 1092 131.431 143 523 39.867
Table 6: Computational performance of the algorithm for n1 ∈ {5, 10, 20, . . . , 60, 65}.
Table 6 shows the computational performance of the algorithm for n1 ∈ {5, 10, 20, . . . , 60, 65}
and Figure 7 represents the corresponding inner approximations of the Eisenberg-Noe systemic risk
measures.
Note that the average time per P2 problem in Table 6 tends to increase as the number of big
banks increases. This happens because the highest connectivity probability, qcon1,1 = 0.7, is the
probability that one big bank is liable to another big bank. Hence, as the number of big banks
increases, the nodes in the network become more connected with liabilities and it takes more time
to solve a P2 problem because the MILP formulations of P2 problems get more complex in terms of
constraints. In addition, it can be observed that the difference between the numbers of inner and
outer approximation vertices and the number of P2 problems increases as the distribution of nodes
changes toward the two extreme cases: 5 big banks and 65 big banks. As in the previous sensitivity
analysis, this happens because the boundaries of the Eisenberg-Noe systemic risk measures around
these extreme cases in Figure 7 contain “flat” regions, which makes the algorithm solve more P2
Figure 7: Inner approximations of the Eisenberg-Noe systemic risk measure for n1 ∈
{5, 10, 20, . . . , 60, 65}.
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problems without actually improving the approximation.
We observe from Figure 7 that as the number of big banks increases and the number of small
banks decreases, the small banks get a wider range of capital allocation options, as opposed to the
big banks. This happens because the total number of banks is fixed and the group with less number
of banks has a wider range of capital allocation options since it has more claims to the other group’s
banks. When the number of banks in each group is evenly distributed, the group of big banks has a
wider range of capital allocation options. The reason lies behind connectivity probabilities. Recall
that for this set-up it is assumed that the connectivity probability from big banks to small banks
is qcon12 = 0.1, while the connectivity probability from small banks to big banks is q
con
21 = 0.5. It
means that small banks are more likely to be liable to big banks and, since big banks have more
claims compared to small banks, they have a wider range of capital allocation options.
4.4 A two-group Rogers-Veraart networks with 45 nodes
In this section, we consider a Rogers-Veraart network (N ,pi, p¯,X, α, β) generated with the following
parameters: n = 45, n1 = 15, n2 = 30, K = 50, ̺ = 0.05 and
qcon =
[
0.5 0.1
0.3 0.5
]
, lgr =
[
200 100
50 50
]
.
In addition, the liquid fraction of the random operating cash flows available to a defaulting node
is fixed as α = 0.7, and the liquid fraction of the realized claims available to a defaulting node is
fixed as β = 0.9. The shape and scale parameters of gamma distributions of the random operating
cash flows Xi, i ∈ Nℓ, ℓ ∈ G, are chosen as
κ =
[
100 64
]
, θ =
[
1 1.25
]
.
Then the mean values of the random operating cash flows in the corresponding groups are
ν =
[
100 80
]
and the common standard deviation is σ = 10. In the corresponding Rogers-Veraart systemic risk
measure, we take γp = 0.9. The approximation error in the algorithm is taken as ǫ = 1.
4.4.1 Rogers-Veraart α parameter
In this part, we perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to α, the liquid fraction of the operating
cash flow that can be used by a defaulting node to meet its obligations. The generated network
α
Inner
approx.
vertices
Outer
approx.
vertices
P2
problems
Avg. time per
P2 prob.
(seconds)
Total algorithm
time (seconds)
Total algorithm
time (hours)
0.1 273 274 333 12.165 4 051 1.125
0.3 461 462 484 10.572 5 117 1.421
0.5 592 593 602 5.231 3 149 0.875
0.7 583 584 584 3.876 2 264 0.629
0.9 589 590 589 3.395 2 000 0.555
Table 7: Computational performance of the algorithm for α ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9}.
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(N ,pi, p¯,X , α, β) remains the same in all cases. Table 7 illustrates the computational performance
of the algorithm for α ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9} and Figure 8 consists of the inner approximations of
the corresponding Rogers-Veraart systemic risk measures.
Figure 8: Inner approximations of the Rogers-Veraart systemic risk measures for α ∈
{0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9}.
Note from Table 7 that the average time per P2 problem decreases with α. It can be presumed
that this happens because of the following observation: as α parameter increases, the discontinuity
in the fixed-point characterization of clearing vectors in the Rogers-Veraart model in (2.13) decreases
and it gets easier to solve the corresponding MILP formulation of a P2 problem because it contains
the constraints of (2.14), the MILP characterization of clearing vectors in the Rogers-Veraart model.
Observe from Figure 8 that the Rogers-Veraart systemic risk measures expand significantly as
α increases. It means that both big and small banks get less strict capital requirements as default
costs decrease. One can also observe that in each case allocating zero capital requirement to the
groups is not an available option. In addition, in each case big banks can be allocated a negative
amount of capital requirement given that the capital requirements for small banks are high enough.
On the other hand, small banks do not have this privilege.
β
Inner
approx.
vertices
Outer
approx.
vertices
P2
problems
Avg. time per
P2 prob.
(seconds)
Total algorithm
time (seconds)
Total algorithm
time (hours)
0.1 187 189 214 5.014 1 073 0.298
0.3 223 225 270 5.561 1 502 0.417
0.5 323 324 350 3.733 1 307 0.363
0.7 394 395 401 3.710 1 488 0.413
0.9 583 584 584 3.876 2 264 0.629
Table 8: Computational performance of the algorithm for β ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9}.
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Figure 9: Inner approximations of the Rogers-Veraart systemic risk measures for β ∈
{0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9}.
4.4.2 Rogers-Veraart β parameter
In this part, we perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to β, the liquid fraction of the realized
claims from the other nodes that can be used by a defaulting node to meet its obligations. The
generated network (N ,pi, p¯,X , α, β) remains the same in all cases. Table 8 shows the computa-
tional performance of the algorithm for β ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9} and Figure 9 provides the inner
approximations of the corresponding Rogers-Veraart systemic risk measures.
Note from Table 8 that the total number of P2 problems increases with β. We can observe
smaller average times per P2 problem for higher values of β. As in the case of the α parameter, it
can be presumed that this happens because of the following observation: as β parameter increases,
the discontinuity in the fixed-point characterization of clearing vectors in the Rogers-Veraart model
in (2.13) decreases, which makes it easier to solve the MILP formulation of a P2 problem.
Observe from Figure 9 that the Rogers-Veraart systemic risk measures expand significantly as β
increases. It means that both big and small banks get less strict capital requirements if defaulting
banks are able to use larger fractions of realized claims. It can also be observed that in each case
allocating zero capital requirement to the groups is not an available option. In addition, if β = 0.9
then big banks can be allocated a negative amount of capital requirement given that the capital
requirements for small banks are high enough. On the other hand, small banks do not have this
privilege.
4.4.3 Threshold level
In this part, different γp levels are compared. Table 9 shows the computational performance of the
algorithm for γp ∈ {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9, 0.95, 0.99, 1} and Figure 10 consists of the inner approximations
of the corresponding Rogers-Veraart systemic risk measures.
It can be noted from Table 9 that the average time per P2 problem and the total algorithm
time are high for γp values around 0.7. In addition, the number of P2 problems increases up to
γp = 0.9 and then decreases. Similar to the structure in Figure 6, we observe in Figure 10 that the
Rogers-Veraart systemic risk measures with smaller γp values contain the ones that have higher γp
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Figure 10: Inner approximations of the Rogers-Veraart systemic risk measure for γp ∈
{0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9, 0.95, 0.99, 1}.
values, which is consistent with the definition of these risk measures.
4.4.4 Distribution of nodes among groups
In this part, we perform a sensitivity analysis by changing the distribution of nodes among the
groups for a fixed total number of nodes n = 45 where the number of big banks n1 takes values in
{5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40}. Then, the number of small banks is n2 = n − n1. Table 10 shows the
computational performance of the algorithm and Figure 11 provides the inner approximations of
the corresponding Rogers-Veraart systemic risk measures.
Note that the average time per P2 problem in Table 10 is relatively high for the values n1 ∈
γp
Inner
approx.
vertices
Outer
approx.
vertices
P2
problems
Avg. time per
P2 prob.
(seconds)
Total algorithm
time (seconds)
Total algorithm
time (hours)
0.1 1 1 1 0.384 0.384 0
0.2 13 14 13 13.809 180 0.050
0.3 51 52 51 30.273 1 544 0.429
0.4 94 95 94 36.645 3 445 0.957
0.5 165 166 165 98.625 16 273 4.520
0.6 223 224 223 138.532 30 893 8.581
0.7 389 390 389 204.288 79 468 22.075
0.8 395 396 395 91.600 36 182 10.051
0.9 583 584 584 3.876 2 264 0.629
0.95 418 419 431 2.946 1 270 0.353
0.99 66 67 74 1.639 121 0.034
1.00 1 1 1 0.132 0.132 0
Table 9: Computational performance of the algorithm for γp ∈ {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9, 0.95, 0.99, 1}.
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Figure 11: Inner approximations of the Rogers-Veraart systemic risk measure for n1 ∈
{5, 10, 15, 25, 30, 35, 40}.
{20, 25, 30, 35, 40}. In addition, the number of P2 problems is greater for the values around n1 = 20.
Observe from Figure 11 that as the number of big banks increases and the number of small banks
decreases, the small banks get a wider range of capital allocation options, as opposed to the big
banks. This happens because the total number of banks is fixed and the group with less number of
banks has a wider range of capital allocation options since it has more claims to the other group’s
banks in the scope of this set-up.
n1
Inner
approx.
vertices
Outer
approx.
vertices
P2
problems
Avg. time per
P2 prob.
(seconds)
Total algorithm
time (seconds)
Total algorithm
time (hours)
5 6 7 6 1.006 6 0.002
10 436 437 436 3.994 1 742 0.484
15 583 584 584 3.876 2 264 0.629
20 516 517 517 7.887 4 078 1.133
25 557 558 557 6.118 3 408 0.947
30 371 372 371 5.786 2 147 0.596
35 187 188 187 6.100 1 141 0.317
40 106 107 108 5.196 561 0.156
Table 10: Computational performance of the algorithm for n1 ∈ {5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40}.
Inner
approx.
vertices
Outer
approx.
vertices
P2
problems
Avg. time per
P2 prob.
(seconds)
Total algorithm
time (seconds)
Total algorithm
time (hours)
413 516 1250 2.904 3631 1.009
Table 11: Computational performance of the algorithm for a signed Eisenberg-Noe network with
10 big, 20 medium and 30 small banks, 50 scenarios and approximation error ǫ = 20.
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4.5 A three-group signed Eisenberg-Noe network with 60 nodes
In this section, we consider a three-group signed Eisenberg-Noe network (N ,pi, p¯,X) generated
with n = 60, n1 = 10, n2 = 20, n3 = 30, K = 50, σ = 100, ̺ = 0.05 and
qcon =

0.4 0.2 0.10.3 0.4 0.1
0.2 0.3 0.4

 , lgr =

20 15 815 10 6
8 6 5

 , ν = [−50 −100 −150] .
In the corresponding Eisenberg-Noe systemic risk measure, we take γp = 0.95.
Table 11 shows the computational performance of the algorithm for ǫ = 20. Figure 12 represents
the inner approximation of the corresponding three-group Eisenberg-Noe systemic risk measure. It
can be presumed that the value of this Eisenberg-Noe systemic risk measure is convex.
Figure 12: Inner approximation of the three-group Eisenberg-Noe systemic risk measure with 60
nodes, 50 scenarios and approximation error ǫ = 20.
4.6 A three-group Rogers-Veraart network with 60 nodes
In this section, we consider a Rogers-Veraart network (N ,pi, p¯,X , α, β) generated with n = 60,
n1 = 10, n2 = 20, n3 = 30, K = 50, ̺ = 0.05, and
qcon =

0.4 0.2 0.10.2 0.3 0.2
0.1 0.2 0.2

 , lgr =

200 190 180190 190 180
180 180 170

 .
In addition, the liquid fraction of the random operating cash flows and the liquid fraction of
the realized claims available to defaulting banks are fixed as α = β = 0.9. The shape and scale
parameters of gamma distributions of Xi, i ∈ Nℓ, ℓ ∈ G, are chosen as
κ =
[
100 81 64
]
, θ =
[
1 109 1.25
]
.
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Inner
approx.
vertices
Outer
approx.
vertices
P2
problems
Avg. time per
P2 prob.
(seconds)
Total algorithm
time (seconds)
Total algorithm
time (hours)
975 1323 19382 0.427 8284 2.301
Table 12: Computational performance of the algorithm for a Rogers-Veraart network with 10 big,
20 medium and 30 small banks, 50 scenarios and approximation error ǫ = 40.
Figure 13: Inner approximation of the three-group Rogers-Veraart systemic risk measure with 60
nodes, 50 scenarios and approximation error ǫ = 40.
In the corresponding Rogers-Veraart systemic risk measure, we take γp = 0.99. The upper bound
point in the approximation is taken as zUB = zˆideal + 15 ‖p¯‖∞.
Table 12 shows the computational performance of the algorithm for ǫ = 40. Figure 13 provides
the inner approximation of the corresponding three-group Rogers-Veraart systemic risk measure.
It can be observed that the value of this Rogers-Veraart systemic risk measure is not convex.
A Proofs of some results in Section 2
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2.11
Proof. If si = 0, then constraint (2.10) is infeasible by assumption. Hence, si = 1, and this yields
pi ≤
∑n
j=1 πjipj + xi and pi ≤ p¯i, by constraints (2.8) and (2.9), respectively. Hence,
pi ≤ min


n∑
j=1
πjipj + xi, p¯i

 .
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To get a contradiction to the claim of the lemma, suppose that pi < min
{∑n
j=1 πjipj + xi, p¯i
}
.
Now let pǫ ∈ Rn+ be equal to p in all components except the ith one, and let pǫi = pi + ǫ, where
ǫ := min

min


n∑
j=1
πjipj + xi, p¯i

− pi,M −maxl∈N

 n∑
j=1
πjlpj + xl

 , ǫ′

 > 0,
and
ǫ′ := min


∣∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
j=1
πjlpj + xl
∣∣∣∣∣∣ |
n∑
j=1
πjlpj + xl < 0, l ∈ N

 .
(Here, we assume that ǫ′ = +∞ if there is no qualifying l ∈ N in the above definition.) This choice
of ǫ ensures
pǫi ≤ p¯i and pǫi ≤
n∑
j=1
πjip
ǫ
j + xi,
and will also be justified by other technical details later in this proof.
Let sǫ ∈ {0, 1}n be a vector of binaries, where sǫl = 0 if
∑n
j=1 πjlp
ǫ
j + xl < 0 and s
ǫ
l = 1 if∑n
j=1 πjlp
ǫ
j + xl ≥ 0, for each l ∈ N . We show that (pǫ, sǫ) is a feasible solution to ΛEN (x) by
showing that all constraints in (2.7) are satisfied. First, for fixed k ∈ N\{i}, we verify the kth
constraints in (2.7) for (pǫ, sǫ). We consider three cases:
(1)
n∑
j=1
πjkpj + xk < 0, (2)
n∑
j=1
πjkpj + xk = 0, (3) 0 <
n∑
j=1
πjkpj + xk.
(1) Assume that
∑n
j=1 πjkpj + xk < 0. If sk = 1, then, by constraint (2.8),
pk ≤
n∑
j=1
πjkpj + xk +M (1− 1) =
n∑
j=1
πjkpj + xk < 0,
which is a contradiction to the feasibility of (p, s) in constraint (2.11). Hence, sk = 0, which
in its turn implies pk = 0 by (2.9) and (2.11).
By the definitions of pǫ and sǫ, it holds that pǫk = pk = 0 since k 6= i, and sǫk = 0. Constraint
(2.8) holds as
pǫk = pk = 0 ≤
n∑
j=1
πjkp
ǫ
j + xk +M (1− sǫk) =
n∑
j=1
πjkpj + xk +M + ǫπik
by the feasibility of pk = 0 and sk = 0, and since ǫ > 0 and πik ≥ 0. Constraint (2.10) holds
as
n∑
j=1
πjkp
ǫ
j + xk =
n∑
j=1
πjkpj + xk + ǫπik ≤
n∑
j=1
πjkpj + xk + ǫ ≤ 0 =Msǫk
since
∑n
j=1 πjkpj + xk < 0, πik ≤ 1 and since a small enough ǫ > 0 is taken to ensure∑n
j=1 πjkpj + xk + ǫ ≤ 0. Constraints (2.9), (2.11), and (2.12) for node k hold trivially by
the feasibility of pk = 0 and sk = 0. Hence, p
ǫ
k = 0 and s
ǫ
k = 0 satisfy the corresponding
constraints in (2.7).
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(2) Assume that
∑n
j=1 πjkpj +xk = 0. Now, either sk = 0 or sk = 1 holds. If sk = 0, then pk = 0
by constraints (2.9) and (2.11). If sk = 1, then, by the assumption of this case and (2.8),
pk ≤
∑n
j=1 πjkpj + xk +M (1− 1) = 0, which, together with (2.11), implies pk = 0.
Also, pǫk = pk = 0 and s
ǫ
k = 1, by the definitions of p
ǫ and sǫ. Constraint (2.8) holds as
pǫk = pk = 0 ≤
n∑
j=1
πjkp
ǫ
j + xk +M (1− sǫk)
=
n∑
j=1
πjkpj + xk +M (1− 1) + ǫπik = ǫπik,
since
∑n
j=1 πjkpj + xk = 0, ǫ > 0 and πik ≥ 0. Constraint (2.10) holds as
n∑
j=1
πjkp
ǫ
j + xk =
n∑
j=1
πjkpj + xk + ǫπik = ǫπik ≤Msǫk =M
since
∑n
j=1 πjkpj + xk = 0, ǫ ≤ min
l∈N
{
M −
(∑n
j=1 πjlpj + xl
)}
≤ M by the definition of ǫ,
and 0 ≤ πik ≤ 1. It is easy to observe that all other constraints in (2.7) for node k are satisfied
trivially by pǫk = 0 and s
ǫ
k = 1.
(3) Assume that 0 <
∑n
j=1 πjkpj + xk. If sk = 0, then, by constraint (2.10),
n∑
j=1
πjkpj + xk ≤Msk = 0,
which is a contradiction to the assumption. Hence, sk = 1. Also, s
ǫ
k = 1, by the definition of
sǫ.
Since sk = 1, (2.9) and (2.11) hold by the feasibility of pk since p
ǫ
k = pk for k 6= i. Also, (2.10)
holds since ǫ > 0 is taken small enough to ensure
n∑
j=1
πjkp
ǫ
j + xk =
n∑
j=1
πjkpj + xk + ǫπik ≤M. (A.1)
Indeed, recall the assumption
∑n
j=1 πjl < n, for each l ∈ N . Hence, for each l ∈ N and for
every p ∈ [0, p¯], ∑nj=1 πjlpj + xl < M , where M = n ‖p¯‖∞ + ‖x‖∞. So, (A.1) is guaranteed
by the choice of ǫ. (This is the reason behind including the term M −max
l∈N
(∑n
j=1 πjlpj + xl
)
in the definition of ǫ.)
Note that, since sk = 1, pk ≤
∑n
j=1 πjkpj + xk holds. Then constraint (2.8) is satisfied since
pǫk = pk ≤
n∑
j=1
πjkpj + xk ≤
n∑
j=1
πjkpj + xk + ǫπik
=
∑
j∈N
j 6=i
πjkpj + πik (pi + ǫ) + xk =
n∑
j=1
πjkp
ǫ
j + xk.
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Constraint (2.12) is satisfied trivially. Hence, pǫk and s
ǫ
k satisfy the corresponding constraints
in (2.7).
Next, we show that pǫi and s
ǫ
i satisfy the constraints in (2.7) for i. It holds s
ǫ
i = 1, since∑n
j=1 πjipj + xi > 0 by the assumption of Lemma 2.11. Then, constraints (2.9) and (2.11) hold
since pǫi = pi + ǫ > 0 and p
ǫ
i = pi + ǫ ≤ pi + p¯i − pi ≤ p¯i, where ǫ ≤ p¯i − pi holds since
ǫ ≤ min
{∑n
j=1 πjipj + xi, p¯i
}
− p¯i. Constraint (2.8) holds as
pǫi = pi + ǫ ≤ pi +
n∑
j=1
πjipj + xi − pi =
n∑
j=1
πjipj + xi
≤
n∑
j=1
πjkpj + xk + ǫπik =
∑
j∈N
j 6=i
πjkpj + πik (pi + ǫ) + xk =
n∑
j=1
πjkp
ǫ
j + xk,
where ǫ ≤ ∑nj=1 πjipj + xi − pi holds since ǫ ≤ min{∑nj=1 πjipj + xi, p¯i} − p¯i. Constraint (2.10)
holds as
n∑
j=1
πjip
ǫ
j + xi =
n∑
j=1
πjipj + xi + ǫπii =
n∑
j=1
πjipj + xi ≤M
by the feasibility of p and since πll = 0, for each l ∈ N . Constraint (2.12) is satisfied trivially.
Hence, pǫi and s
ǫ
i satisfy the corresponding constraints in (2.7).
Hence, (pǫ, sǫ) is a feasible solution to ΛEN (x). However, since pǫ ≥ p with pǫ 6= p and f is a
strictly increasing function, it holds that f (pǫ) > f (p), which is a contradiction to the optimality
of p. Hence, pi = min
{∑n
j=1 πjipj + xi, p¯i
}
.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2.20
Proof. To get a contradiction, suppose that si = 0. Then pi ≤ αxi+β
∑n
j=1 πjipj < p¯i by constraint
(2.16) and the assumption. Let p′ ∈ Rn+ be equal to p in all components except the ith one, and
let p′i = p¯i. Also, let s
′ ∈ Rn+ be equal to s in all components except the ith one, and let s′i = 1.
We show that (p′, s′) is a feasible solution to ΛRV+ (x) by checking that all constraints in
(2.15) are satisfied. First, for fixed k ∈ N\{i}, we verify the kth constraints in (2.15) for (p′, s′).
Constraints (2.16) and (2.17) hold as
p′k = pk ≤ αxk + β
n∑
j=1
πjkpj + p¯ksk
≤ αxk + β
n∑
j=1
πjkpj + p¯ksk + πik (p¯i − pi) = αxk + β
n∑
j=1
πjkp
′
j + p¯ks
′
k,
and
p¯ks
′
k = p¯ksk ≤ xk +
n∑
j=1
πjkpj ≤ xk +
n∑
j=1
πjkpj + πik (p¯i − pi) = xk +
n∑
j=1
πjkp
′
j ,
since p′k = pk, s
′
k = sk for every k ∈ K such that k 6= i, p¯i − pi > 0, πik ≥ 0, and by the feasibility
of (p, s). Constraints (2.18), (2.19) hold trivially by the feasibility of (p, s).
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Next, we verify the ith constraints in (2.15) for p′i = p¯i, s
′
i = 1. Constraints (2.16) and (2.17)
hold as
p′i = p¯i ≤ αxi + β
n∑
j=1
πjipj + p¯is
′
i
= αxi + β
n∑
j=1
πjipj + p¯i + πii (p¯i − pi) = αxi + β
n∑
j=1
πjip
′
j + p¯i,
and
p¯is
′
i = p¯i ≤ xi +
n∑
j=1
πjipj = xi +
n∑
j=1
πjipj + πii (p¯i − pi) = xi +
n∑
j=1
πjip
′
j ,
since αxi + β
∑n
j=1 πjip
′
j ≥ 0, πii = 0 and by the assumption of Lemma 2.20. Constraints (2.18),
(2.19) are satisfied trivially.
Hence, (p′, s′) is a feasible solution to ΛRV+ (x). However, since p′ ≥ p with p′ 6= p and f is a
strictly increasing function, it holds that f (p′) > f (p), which is a contradiction to the optimality
of p. Hence, si = 1.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2.21
Proof. To get a contradiction, suppose that pi < p¯i. Let p
′ ∈ Rn+ be equal to p in all components
except the ith one, and let p′i = p¯i
We show that (p′, s) is a feasible solution to ΛRV+ (x) by showing that all constraints in (2.15)
are satisfied. First, for fixed k ∈ N\{i}, we verify the kth constraints in (2.15) for (p′, s). Con-
straints (2.16) and (2.17) hold as
p′k = pk ≤ αxk + β
n∑
j=1
πjkpj + p¯ksk
≤ αxk + β
n∑
j=1
πjkpj + p¯ksk + πik (p¯i − pi) = αxk + β
n∑
j=1
πjkp
′
j + p¯ksk,
and
p¯ksk ≤ xk +
n∑
j=1
πjkpj ≤ xk +
n∑
j=1
πjkpj + πik (p¯i − pi) = xk +
n∑
j=1
πjkp
′
j,
since p′k = pk for every k ∈ K such that k 6= i, p¯i − pi > 0, πik ≥ 0 and by the feasibility of (p, s).
Constraints (2.18), (2.19) hold trivially by the feasibility of (p, s).
Next, we verify the ith constraints in (2.15) for p′i = p¯i, si. We consider two cases:
(1) p¯i ≤ αxi + β
n∑
j=1
πjipj , (2) αxi + β
n∑
j=1
πjipj < p¯i.
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(1) If the first case holds, then constraints (2.16) and (2.17) hold for both si = 0 and si = 1 as
p′i = p¯i ≤ αxi + β
n∑
j=1
πjipj + p¯isi
= αxi + β
n∑
j=1
πjipj + p¯isi + πii (p¯i − pi) = αxi + β
n∑
j=1
πjip
′
j + p¯isi,
and
p¯isi ≤ xi +
n∑
j=1
πjipj = xi +
n∑
j=1
πjipj + πii (p¯i − pi) = xi +
n∑
j=1
πjip
′
j ,
since πii = 0 and by the assumption of Lemma 2.21. Constraints (2.18), (2.19) hold trivially.
(2) If the second case holds, then, by Lemma 2.20, si = 1. Then constraints (2.16) and (2.17)
hold as
p′i = p¯i ≤ αxi + β
n∑
j=1
πjipj + p¯isi
= αxi + β
n∑
j=1
πjipj + p¯i + πii (p¯i − pi) = αxi + β
n∑
j=1
πjip
′
j + p¯i,
and
p¯isi = p¯i ≤ xi +
n∑
j=1
πjipj = xi +
n∑
j=1
πjipj + πii (p¯i − pi) = xi +
n∑
j=1
πjip
′
j,
since πii = 0 and by the assumption of Lemma 2.21. Constraints (2.18), (2.19) are satisfied
trivially.
Hence, (p′, s) is a feasible solution to ΛRV+ (x). However, since p′ ≥ p with p′ 6= p and f is a
strictly increasing function, it holds that f (p′) > f (p), which is a contradiction to the optimality
of p. Hence, pi = p¯i.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 2.22
Proof. To get a contradiction, suppose that pi 6= αxi + β
∑n
j=1 πjipj. If si = 1, then constraint
(2.17) is not satisfied by assumption. Hence, si = 0 and pi < αxi+β
∑n
j=1 πjipj by constraint (2.16).
Let p′ ∈ Rn+ be equal to p in all components except the ith one, and let p′i = αxi + β
∑n
j=1 πjipj.
We show that (p′, s) is a feasible solution to ΛRV+ (x) by checking that all constraints in
(2.15) are satisfied. First, for fixed k ∈ N\{i}, we verify the kth constraints in (2.15) for (p′, s).
Constraints (2.16) and (2.17) hold as
p′k = pk ≤ αxk + β
n∑
j=1
πjkpj + p¯ksk
≤ αxk + β
n∑
j=1
πjkpj + p¯ksk + πik (p¯i − pi) = αxk + β
n∑
j=1
πjkp
′
j + p¯ksk,
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and
p¯ksk ≤ xk +
n∑
j=1
πjkpj ≤ xk +
n∑
j=1
πjkpj + πik (p¯i − pi) = xk +
n∑
j=1
πjkp
′
j,
since p′k = pk for every k ∈ K such that k 6= i, p¯i − pi > 0, πik ≥ 0 and by the feasibility of (p, s).
Constraints (2.18), (2.19) hold trivially by the feasibility of (p, s).
Next, we verify the ith constraints in (2.15) for p′i = αxi + β
∑n
j=1 πjipj, si = 0. Constraints
(2.16) and (2.17) hold as
p′i = αxi + β
n∑
j=1
πjipj ≤ αxi + β
n∑
j=1
πjipj + p¯isi
= αxi + β
n∑
j=1
πjipj + πii (p¯i − pi) = αxi + β
n∑
j=1
πjip
′
j ,
and
p¯isi = 0 ≤ xi +
n∑
j=1
πjipj = xi +
n∑
j=1
πjipj + πii (p¯i − pi) = xi +
n∑
j=1
πjip
′
j,
since πii = 0 and xi +
∑n
j=1 πjipj ≥ 0. Constraints (2.18), (2.19) are satisfied trivially.
Hence, (p′, s) is a feasible solution to ΛRV+ (x). However, since p′ ≥ p with p′ 6= p and f is a
strictly increasing function, it holds that f (p′) > f (p), which is a contradiction to the optimality
of p. Hence, pi = p¯i.
B Proofs of some results in Section 3
For convenience, let us rewrite the mixed-integer linear programming problem in (3.13) more ex-
plicitly as
minimize zℓ (B.1)
subject to
∑
k∈K
qk1Tpk ≥ γ, (B.2)
pki ≤
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j + (Xi(ω
k) + (BTz)i) +M(1− ski ), ∀i ∈ N , k ∈ K, (B.3)
pki ≤ p¯iski , ∀i ∈ N , k ∈ K, (B.4)
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j + (Xi(ω
k) + (BTz)i) ≤Mski , ∀i ∈ N , k ∈ K, (B.5)
0 ≤ pki ≤ p¯i, ∀i ∈ N , k ∈ K, (B.6)
ski ∈ {0, 1} , ∀i ∈ N , k ∈ K, (B.7)
z ∈ RG. (B.8)
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B.1 Proof of Proposition 3.6
Proof. Let (z, (pk, sk)k∈K) be an optimal solution of the problem in (3.13). To get a contradiction,
suppose that zℓ > ‖X‖∞ + ‖p¯‖∞. Let z′ ∈ RG be the vector such that z′ℓ = ‖X‖∞ + ‖p¯‖∞ and
z′
ℓˆ
= z
ℓˆ
for each ℓˆ ∈ G \ {ℓ}. We claim that (z′, (pk, sk)k∈K) is a feasible solution of the problem in
(3.13). Indeed, for each i ∈ N , k ∈ K such that (BTz′)
i
= ‖X‖∞ + ‖p¯‖∞, constraint (B.3) holds
as
pki ≤
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j +
(
Xi(ω
k) + (BTz′)i
)
+M(1− ski )
=
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j +Xi(ω
k) + ‖X‖∞ + ‖p¯‖∞ +M(1− ski )
since
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j ≥ 0, Xi(ωk) + ‖X‖∞ ≥ 0, pki ≤ p¯i ≤ ‖p¯‖∞ , M(1− ski ) ≥ 0.
Also, for each i ∈ N , k ∈ K such that (BTz′)i = ‖X‖∞ + ‖p¯‖∞, constraint (B.5) holds as
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j +
(
Xi(ω
k) + (BTz′)i
)
=
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j +Xi(ω
k) + ‖X‖∞ + ‖p¯‖∞
<
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j +Xi(ω
k) + zℓ ≤Mski ,
which holds by the supposition ‖X‖∞ + ‖p¯‖∞ < zℓ and the feasibility of (z, (pk, sk)k∈K). All
the other constraints in (B.1) hold by the feasibility of (z, (pk, sk)k∈K), since they are free of
‖X‖∞ + ‖p¯‖∞. Hence, the claim follows, which yields zℓ = ZEN1
(
eℓ
) ≤ z′ℓ = ‖X‖∞ + ‖p¯‖∞. As
this is a contradiction, the result follows.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 3.7
Proof. To get a contradiction, suppose that the problem in (3.13) has a feasible solution but
ZEN1 (eℓ) = −∞. Since ZEN1 (eℓ) = −∞, there exist ǫ > 0 and (z, (pk, sk)k∈K), where z ∈ RG
and (pk, sk) ∈ Rn × Zn for each k ∈ K, such that eℓTz = zℓ = −2M and (z − ǫeℓ, (pk, sk)k∈K) is a
feasible solution for the problem in (3.13). Fix i ∈ N , k ∈ K such that (BTz)i = zℓ = −2M . Then,
constraint (B.3) contradicts constraint (B.6) as
pki ≤
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j + (Xi(ω
k) + (BT(z − ǫeℓ))i) +M(1− ski )
≤
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j +Xi(ω
k)− 2M − ǫ+M
=
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j +Xi(ω
k)− ǫ− 2 ‖X‖∞ − (n+ 1) ‖p¯‖∞
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=
 n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j − n ‖p¯‖∞

+ (Xi(ωk)− 2 ‖X‖∞)− ‖p¯‖∞ − ǫ < 0
since
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j < n ‖p¯‖∞ , Xi(ωk) ≤ 2 ‖X‖∞ , −‖p¯‖∞ < 0, −ǫ < 0.
Hence, (z − ǫeℓ, (pk, sk)k∈K) is infeasible, which is a contradiction to the assumption. Hence,
ZEN1 (eℓ) > −∞. In addition, the existence of a feasible solution implies that ZEN1 (eℓ) < +∞.
Hence, ZEN1 (eℓ) ∈ R.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 3.8
Proof. Assume that γ ≤ 1Tp¯. Let z = (‖X‖∞ + ‖p¯‖∞)1, pk = p¯, sk = 1 for each k ∈ K. We
show that (z, (pk, sk)k∈K) is a feasible solution for the problem in (3.13). Since p
k = p¯ for each
k ∈ K, it is clear that ∑k∈K qk1Tpk = 1Tp¯ ≥ γ. Hence, constraint (B.2) holds. Let i ∈ N , k ∈ K.
Constraint (B.3) holds as
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j +
(
Xi(ω
k) + (BTz)i
)
+M(1− ski )
=
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j +Xi(ω
k) + (‖X‖∞ + ‖p¯‖∞)(BT1)i +M(1− 1)
=
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j +Xi(ω
k) + ‖X‖∞ + ‖p¯‖∞ ≥ p¯i = pki
since
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j ≥ 0, Xi(ωk) + ‖X‖∞ ≥ 0, (BT1)i = 1, ski = 1.
Constraint (B.5) holds as
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j +
(
Xi(ω
k) + (BTz)i
)
=
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j +Xi(ω
k) + ‖X‖∞ + ‖p¯‖∞
≤ 2 ‖X‖∞ + (n+ 1) ‖p¯‖∞ =M =Mski ,
since
∑n
j=1 πjip
k
j ≤ n ‖p¯‖∞. All the other constraints in (B.1) hold trivially by the choice of z, pk
and sk, for each k ∈ K. Hence, (z, (pk, sk)k∈K) is a feasible solution of the problem in (3.13).
Conversely, if γ > 1Tp¯, then constraint (B.2) is infeasible, since
∑
k∈K q
k
1
Tpk ≤ 1Tp¯ < γ by
constraint (B.6). Hence, the problem in (3.13) is infeasible, which concludes the proof.
The mixed-integer linear programming problem of calculating ZRV+1
(
eℓ
)
in (3.16) can be written
more explicitly as
minimize zℓ (B.9)
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subject to
∑
k∈K
qk1Tpk ≥ γ, (B.10)
pki ≤ α
(
Xi(ω
k) + (BTz)i
)
+ β
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j + p¯is
k
i , ∀i ∈ N , k ∈ K, (B.11)
p¯is
k
i ≤
(
Xi(ω
k) + (BTz)i
)
+
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j , ∀i ∈ N , k ∈ K, (B.12)
Xi(ω
k) + (BTz)i ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N , k ∈ K, (B.13)
0 ≤ pki ≤ p¯i, ∀i ∈ N , k ∈ K, (B.14)
ski ∈ {0, 1} , ∀i ∈ N , k ∈ K, (B.15)
z ∈ RG. (B.16)
Here, constraint (B.13) ensures X + BTz ≥ 0 so that ΛRV+ (X (ωk)+BTz) 6= −∞ for every
k ∈ K.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 3.11
Proof. Let (z, (pk, sk)k∈K) be an optimal solution of the problem in (3.16). To get a contradiction,
suppose that zℓ > ‖X‖∞ + 1α ‖p¯‖∞. Let z′ ∈ Rn be the vector such that z′ℓ = ‖X‖∞ + 1α ‖p¯‖∞
and z′
ℓˆ
= z
ℓˆ
for each ℓˆ ∈ G \ {ℓ}. Similar to the argument in the proof of Proposition 3.6, it
can be checked that (z′, (pk, sk)k∈K) is a feasible solution of the problem in (3.16). Hence, zℓ =
ZRV+1
(
eℓ
) ≤ z′ℓ = ‖X‖∞ + 1α ‖p¯‖∞. As this is a contradiction, the result follows.
B.5 Proof of Proposition 3.12
Proof. To get a contradiction, suppose that the problem in (3.16) has a feasible solution but
ZRV+1 (eℓ) = −∞. Let M = ‖X‖∞+ 1α (n+ 1) ‖p¯‖∞. Since ZRV+1 (eℓ) = −∞, there exist ǫ > 0 and
(z, (pk, sk)k∈K), where z ∈ Rn and (pk, sk) ∈ Rn × Zn for each k ∈ K, such that eℓTz = zℓ = −M
and (z−ǫeℓ, (pk, sk)k∈K) is a feasible solution for the problem in (3.16). Fix i ∈ N , k ∈ K such that(
BTz
)
i
= zℓ = −M . Similar to the argument in the proof of Proposition 3.7, it can be checked that
constraint (B.11) contradicts constraint (B.14). Hence, (z − ǫeℓ, (pk, sk)k∈K) is infeasible, which is
a contradiction to the assumption. Hence, ZRV+1 (eℓ) > −∞. In addition, the existence of a feasible
solution implies that ZRV+1 (eℓ) < +∞. Hence, ZRV+1 (eℓ) ∈ R.
B.6 Proof of Proposition 3.13
Proof. Assume that γ ≤ 1Tp¯. Let z = (‖X‖∞ + 1α ‖p¯‖∞)1, pk = p¯, sk = 1 for each k ∈ K.
As in the proof of Proposition 3.8, it can be checked that (z, (pk, sk)k∈K) is a feasible solution
for the problem in (3.16). Conversely, if γ > 1Tp¯, then constraint (B.10) is infeasible, since∑
k∈K q
k
1
Tpk ≤ 1Tp¯ < γ by constraint (B.14). Hence, the problem in (3.16) is infeasible, which
concludes the proof.
The mixed-integer linear programming problem of computing ZEN2 (v) in (3.21) can be written
more explicitly as
minimize µ (B.17)
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subject to
∑
k∈K
qk1Tpk ≥ γ, (B.18)
pki ≤
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j + (Xi(ω
k) + (BTv)i + µ) +M(1 − ski ), ∀i ∈ N , k ∈ K, (B.19)
pki ≤ p¯iski , ∀i ∈ N , k ∈ K, (B.20)
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j + (Xi(ω
k) + (BTv)i + µ) ≤Mski , ∀i ∈ N , k ∈ K, (B.21)
0 ≤ pki ≤ p¯i, ∀i ∈ N , k ∈ K, (B.22)
ski ∈ {0, 1} , ∀i ∈ N , k ∈ K. (B.23)
B.7 Proof of Proposition 3.16
Proof. Let (µ, (pk, sk)k∈K) be an optimal solution of the problem in (3.21). To get a contradiction,
suppose that µ > ‖X‖∞ + ‖v‖∞ + ‖p¯‖∞. We claim that (µmax, (pk, sk)k∈K) is a feasible solution
of the problem in (3.21). Let i ∈ N , k ∈ K. Note that constraint (B.19) holds as
pki ≤
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j + (Xi(ω
k) + (BTv)i + µ
max) +M(1− ski )
=
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j +Xi(ω
k) + (BTv)i + ‖X‖∞ + ‖v‖∞ + ‖p¯‖∞ +M(1− ski )
=
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j + (Xi(ω
k) + ‖X‖∞) + ((BTv)i + ‖v‖∞) + ‖p¯‖∞ +M(1 − ski ),
since
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j ≥ 0, Xi(ωk) + ‖X‖∞ ≥ 0, (BTv)i + ‖v‖∞ ≥ 0,
pki ≤ ‖p¯‖∞ , M(1− ski ) ≥ 0.
Constraint (B.21) holds as
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j +
(
Xi(ω
k) + (BTv)i + ‖X‖∞ + ‖v‖∞ + ‖p¯‖∞
)
<
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j +
(
Xi(ω
k) + (BTv)i + µ
)
≤Mski =M
by the assumption ‖X‖∞ + ‖v‖∞ + ‖p¯‖∞ < µ and the feasibility of (µ, (pk, sk)k∈K). All the
other constraints in (B.17) hold by the feasibility of (µ, (pk, sk)k∈K), since they are free of ‖X‖∞+
‖v‖∞ + ‖p¯‖∞. Hence, the claim follows, which yields µ = ZEN2 (v) ≤ ‖X‖∞ + ‖v‖∞ + ‖p¯‖∞. As
this is a contradiction, we obtain the desired result.
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B.8 Proof of Proposition 3.17
Proof. To get a contradiction, suppose that the problem in (3.21) has a feasible solution but
ZEN2 (v) = −∞. Then, there exist ǫ > 0 and (pk, sk)k∈K, where (pk, sk) ∈ Rn × Zn for each
k ∈ K, such that (−2M − ǫ, (pk, sk)k∈K) is a feasible solution of the problem in (3.21). Fix i ∈ N ,
k ∈ K. Then constraint (B.19) violates constraint (B.22) as
pki ≤
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j +
(
Xi(ω
k) + (BTv)i − 2M − ǫ
)
+M(1 − ski )
≤
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j +Xi(ω
k) + (BTv)i − ǫ−M
=
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j +Xi(ω
k) + (BTv)i − ǫ− 2 ‖X‖∞ − 2 ‖v‖∞ − (n+ 1) ‖p¯‖∞
=

 n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j − (n+ 1) ‖p¯‖∞

+ (Xi(ωk)− 2 ‖X‖∞)+ ((BTv)i − 2 ‖v‖∞)− ǫ < 0,
since
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j < (n+ 1) ‖p¯‖∞ , Xi(ωk) ≤ 2 ‖X‖∞ , (BTv)i ≤ 2 ‖v‖∞ , −ǫ < 0.
Hence, (−2M − ǫ, (pk, sk)k∈K) is infeasible, which is a contradiction to the assumption. Hence,
ZEN2 (v) > −∞. On the other hand, ZEN2 (v) < +∞ by the existence of a feasible solution. So
ZEN2 (v) ∈ R.
B.9 Proof of Proposition 3.18
Proof. Assume that γ ≤ 1Tp¯. Let µ = ‖X‖∞+ ‖v‖∞+ ‖p¯‖∞, pk = p¯, sk = 1 for each k ∈ K. We
show that (µ, (pk, sk)k∈K) is a feasible solution for the problem in (3.21). Since p
k = p¯ for each
k ∈ K, it holds that ∑k∈K qk1Tpk = 1Tp¯ ≥ γ. Hence, constraint (B.18) holds. Now fix i ∈ N ,
k ∈ K. Constraint (B.19) holds as
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j +
(
Xi(ω
k) + (BTv)i + µ
)
+M(1− ski )
=
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j +Xi(ω
k) + (BTv)i + µ+M(1− 1)
=
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j +Xi(ω
k) + (BTv)i + ‖X‖∞ + ‖v‖∞ + ‖p¯‖∞ ≥ p¯i = pki ,
since
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j ≥ 0, Xi(ωk) + ‖X‖∞ ≥ 0, (BTv)i + ‖v‖∞ ≥ 0,
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and ski = 1, by the choice of s
k. Constraint (B.21) holds as
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j +
(
Xi(ω
k) + (BTv)i + µ
)
=
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j +Xi(ω
k) + (BTv)i + ‖X‖∞ + ‖v‖∞ + ‖p¯‖∞
≤ 2 ‖X‖∞ + 2 ‖v‖∞ + (n+ 1) ‖p¯‖∞ =M =Mski ,
since
∑n
j=1 πjip
k
j ≤ n ‖p¯‖∞. All the other constraints hold trivially by the choice of µ, pk and sk,
for each k ∈ K. Hence, (µ, (pk, sk)k∈K) is a feasible solution for the problem in (3.21).
Conversely, if γ > 1Tp¯, then constraint (B.18) is infeasible, since
∑
k∈K q
k
1
Tpk ≤ 1Tp¯ < γ, by
constraint (B.22). Hence, the problem in (3.21) is infeasible, which finishes the proof.
The mixed-integer linear programming problem for calculating ZRV+2 (v) in (3.23) can be written
more explicitly as
minimize µ (B.24)
subject to
∑
k∈K
qk1Tpk ≥ γ, (B.25)
pki ≤ α
(
Xi(ω
k) + (BTv)i + µ
)
+ β
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j + p¯is
k
i , ∀i ∈ N , k ∈ K, (B.26)
p¯is
k
i ≤
(
Xi(ω
k) + (BTv)i + µ
)
+
n∑
j=1
πjip
k
j , ∀i ∈ N , k ∈ K, (B.27)
Xi(ω
k) + (BTv)i + µ ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N , k ∈ K, (B.28)
0 ≤ pki ≤ p¯i, ∀i ∈ N , k ∈ K, (B.29)
ski ∈ {0, 1} , ∀i ∈ N , k ∈ K. (B.30)
Here, constraint (B.28) ensures X +BTv + µ1 ≥ 0 so that ΛRV+(X(ωk) + BTv + µ1) 6= +∞ for
every k ∈ K.
B.10 Proof of Proposition 3.22
Proof. Let (µ, (pk, sk)k∈K) be an optimal solution for the problem in (3.23). To get a contradiction,
suppose that µ > ‖X‖∞ + ‖v‖∞ + 1α ‖p¯‖∞. Following similar arguments as in the proof of Propo-
sition 3.16, it can be shown that (‖X‖∞ + ‖v‖∞ + 1α ‖p¯‖∞ , (pk, sk)k∈K) is a feasible solution for
the problem in (3.23). Hence, µ = ZRV+2 (v) ≤ ‖X‖∞ + ‖v‖∞ + 1α ‖p¯‖∞, which is a contradiction.
Hence, the result follows.
B.11 Proof of Proposition 3.23
Proof. To get a contradiction, suppose that the problem in (3.23) has a feasible solution but
ZRV+2 (v) = −∞. LetM = ‖X‖∞+‖v‖∞+ 1α (n+ 1) ‖p¯‖∞. Then, there exist ǫ > 0 and (pk, sk)k∈K,
where
(
pk, sk
) ∈ Rn × Zn for each k ∈ K, such that (−M − ǫ, (pk, sk)k∈K) is a feasible solution
for the problem in (3.23). Fix i ∈ N , k ∈ K. As in the proof of Corollary 3.17, it can be checked
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that constraint (B.26) violates constraint (B.29). Hence, (−M − ǫ, (pk, sk)k∈K) is infeasible, which
is a contradiction to the assumption. Hence, ZRV+2 (v) > −∞. Together with the feasibility of the
problem, it follows that ZRV+2 (v) ∈ R.
B.12 Proof of Proposition 3.24
Proof. Assume that γ ≤ 1Tp¯. Let µ = ‖X‖∞ + ‖v‖∞ + 1α ‖p¯‖∞, pk = p¯, sk = 1 for each
k ∈ K. As in the proof of Corollary 3.24, it can be shown that (µ, (pk, sk)k∈K) is a feasible
solution for the problem in (3.23). Conversely, if γ > 1Tp¯, then constraint (B.25) is infeasible,
since
∑
k∈K q
k
1
Tpk ≤ 1Tp¯ < γ, by constraint (B.29). Hence, the problem in (3.23) is infeasible,
which concludes the proof.
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